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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a decision-theoretic approach to policy analysis. We argue that policy
evaluation should be conducted on the basis of two factors: the policymaker’s preferences, and the
conditional distribution of the outcomes of interest given a policy and available information. From
this perspective, the common practice of conditioning on a particular model is often inappropriate,
since model uncertainty is an important element of policy evaluation. We advocate the use of model
averaging to account for model uncertainty and show how it may be applied to policy evaluation




















kdwest@wisc.eduThe number of separate variables which in any particular social 
phenomenon will determine the result of a given change will as a rule be 
far too large for any human mind to master and manipulate them 
effectively.  In consequence, our knowledge of the principle by which 
these phenomena are produced will rarely if ever enable us to predict the 
precise result of any concrete situation.  While we can explain the 
principle on which certain phenomena are produced and can from this 
knowledge exclude the possibility of certain results…our knowledge will 
in a sense only be negative, i.e. it… will not enable us to narrow the range 






It will be remembered that the seventy translators of the Septuagint were 
shut up in seventy separate rooms with the Hebrew text and brought with 
them, when they emerged, seventy identical translations. Would the same 
miracle be vouchsafed if seventy multiple correlators were shut up with 
the same statistical material?  And anyhow, I suppose, if each had a 
different economist perched on his a priori, that would make a difference 








  This paper describes some approaches to macroeconomic policy evaluation in the 
presence of uncertainty about the structure of the environment under study.  The 
perspective we discuss is designed to facilitate policy evaluation for several forms of 
uncertainty.  For example, our approach may be used when an analyst is unsure about the 
appropriate economic theory that should be assumed; it may also be employed when an 
analyst is unsure about the particular functional forms that translate a general theory into 
a form amenable to statistical analysis.  As such, these methods are, we believe, 
particularly useful in a range of macroeconomic contexts where there are fundamental 
disagreements as to the determinants of the problem under study.  In addition, this 
approach recognizes that even if one agrees on the underlying economic theory that 
describes a phenomenon, policy evaluation often requires taking a stance on details of the 
economic environment such as lag lengths and functional form that are not specified by 
  1the theory.  As such, our analysis is motivated by similar concerns as led to the 
development of model calibration methods.  Unlike the usual calibration approach, we do 
not reject formal statistical inference methods but rather incorporate model uncertainty 
into them. 
The key intuition underlying our analysis is that for a broad range of contexts, 
policy evaluation can be conducted based upon two factors: (1) a policymaker’s 
preferences and (2) the conditional distribution of the outcomes of interest given a policy 
and available information.  What this means is that one of the main objects of interest to 
scholarly researchers, identification of the true or best model of the economy, is of no 
intrinsic importance in the policy evaluation context; even though knowledge of this 
model would, were it available, be very relevant in policy evaluation.  Hence model 
selection, which is a major endeavor in much of empirical macroeconomic research, is 
not a necessary component of policy evaluation.   
In contrast, our argument is that, in many cases, model selection is actually 
inappropriate, as conditioning policy evaluation on a particular model ignores the role of 
model uncertainty in the overall uncertainty that exists with respect to the effects of a 
given policy choice.  This is true both in the sense that many statistical analyses of 
policies do not systematically evaluate the robustness of policies across different model 
specifications and in the sense that many analyses fail to adequately account for the 
effects of model selection on statistical inference. In contrast, we advocate the use of 
model averaging methods, which represent a formal way through which one can avoid 
policy evaluation that is conditional on a particular economic model.   
From the perspective of the theory of policy evaluation, model uncertainty has 
important implications for the evaluation of policies.  This was originally recognized in 
William Brainard’s classic analysis
4, where model uncertainty occurs in the sense that the 
effects of a policy on a macroeconomic outcome of interest are unknown, but may be 
described by the distribution of a parameter (one that measures the marginal effect of the 
policy on the outcome).  Much of what we argue in terms of theory may be interpreted as 
a generalization of Brainard’s original framework and associated insights to a broader 
class of model uncertainty. 
  2An additional advantage of our approach is that it provides a firm foundation for 
the integration of empirical analysis with policy evaluation.  By explicitly casting policy 
evaluation exercises as the comparison of the losses associated with the distribution of 
macroeconomic outcomes conditional on alternative policy scenarios, connections 
between the observed history of the economy and policy advice are seamlessly 
integrated.  Conventional approaches, which often equate evaluation of the efficacy of a 
policy with the statistical significance of an estimated coefficient, do not embody an 
equally straightforward way of moving from empirical findings to policy outcomes.   
Hence, one practical implication of our discussion is that the reporting of empirical 
results for policy analysis should focus more explicitly on describing probability 
distributions for outcomes of interest, conditioned on a given policy, rather than on 
statistical significance testing per se. 
  Our goals in this paper are ambitious in that we are attempting to place policy 
theoretical and empirical evaluation exercises in a framework that properly accounts for 
the decision-theoretic nature of the question and which properly accounts for the different 
types of uncertainty.  As such, we are motivated by similar concerns as have influenced a 
number of other researchers.  Many of James Heckman’s contributions may be 
interpreted as providing methods for policy analysis, specifically policy analysis that 
properly accounts for the ways in which individuals make decisions.
5  In terms of explicit 
decision-theory approaches, Gary Chamberlain
6 and Christopher Sims
7 have argued in 
favor of Bayesian decision-theoretic approaches to data analysis.
8  Charles Manski
9 has, 
in contexts where one cannot identify which of several models explain a given data set, 
advocated an approach that focuses on finding undominated policies, i.e. policies that are 
optimal for at least one model consistent with the data.  Our own approach has been 
strongly influenced by this important work and we will indicate in the course of our 
discussion where our approach overlaps with and where our approach contrasts with this 
previous research.  And of course, much of what motivates our discussion is modern 
statistical decision theory, which now functions as a foundation of Bayesian statistics. 
We are also far from the first researchers to attempt to integrate concerns about 
model uncertainty into policy analysis.  In terms of general econometric questions, 
Edward Leamer has made a range of fundamental contributions to the development of 
  3methods of econometric inference that account for model uncertainty.
10 Leamer’s ideas 
have motivated a number of recent developments in the statistics literature.
11  In terms of 
the theory of policy analysis, Lars Hansen and Thomas Sargent, for example, have 
pioneered the use of robust control theory to evaluate macroeconomic policy in 
environments in which model uncertainty may be characterized as occurring around a 
particular core model.
12 This research program has initiated new directions in policy 
evaluation which focus on how to construct policies that are robust against unfavorable 
draws from the space of possible models.  
Further, model uncertainty has motivated a range of empirical analyses.  The 
monetary policy rules literature has become quite explicit in this objective. And to be fair, 
it is rare to see an empirical paper that does not consider some modifications to a given 
baseline specification to see whether particular empirical claims are robust across 
modifications.
13 Within the economic growth literature, analyses such as those by Ross 
Levine and David Renelt
14 and Xavier Sala-i-Martin
15 have modified standard growth 
regression analysis to account for model uncertainty; Gernot Doppelhofer, Ronald Miller, 
and Sala-i-Martin and Carmen Fernandez, Eduardo Ley and Mark Steel
16 have explicitly 
employed the averaging approach to model uncertainty that we endorse.
17  And of course, 
empirical work very typically involves a consideration of the robustness of findings 
across different specifications of the estimated model, application of the model to 
different subsamples of data, etc.  It is therefore a caricature of the empirical literature to 
suggest that model uncertainty is generally ignored.  Relative to these applied 
approaches, we believe our analysis will have some useful suggestions on how to make 
robustness analyses more systematic and how to link the evaluation of model uncertainty 
to the goals of an econometric exercise in a more effective fashion.   
  While our goals are ambitious, it is important to recognize that there are important 
limits in the extent to which we have achieved them.  While the decision-theoretic 
approach is, in an abstract sense, an extremely appealing way to engage in econometric 
policy evaluation, there are significant open questions as to how one would implement 
the approach.  We will discuss some ways of making decision theory and model 
averaging operational, but there is still very substantial work that needs to be done.   
Finally, we wish to be clear that we do not believe there is “one true path” for empirical 
  4work.  Debates concerning the philosophical merits of Bayesian versus frequentist 
approaches, etc. are of little intrinsic use to us.  We are interested in the pragmatic 
questions that revolve around the use of theoretical and econometric models to inform 
policy evaluation.  
  Section 2 of the paper introduces a basic framework for policy evaluation.  The 
discussion in this section is designed to place policy evaluation in a decision-theoretic 
framework, a framework that we will exploit throughout the paper.  Section 3 provides an 
analysis of how model uncertainty affects policy evaluation.  We contrast our perspective 
with other recent efforts in the economics literature to address model uncertainty.   
Section 4 explores some theoretical implications of model uncertainty for policy 
evaluation. Section 5 discusses some issues that arise in implementing the general 
decision-theoretic framework we have described.  First, we show how our basic 
framework may be applied under Bayesian, frequentist, and Waldean perspectives on 
policy evaluation. Second, we discuss a number of questions that arise when one is 
specifying a space of possible models.  Section 6 provides two applications of our ideas: 
monetary policy rules and the analysis of growth policies.  These applications are 
designed to follow previous empirical work closely in order to illustrate how to 
implement some of the methodological ideas we advocate.  Section 7 provides summary 
and conclusions.  Computational and data appendices follow. 
 
 
2. Decision theory and uncertainty 
  
  In this section, we describe a basic decision-theoretic approach to policy 
evaluation.  The abstract ideas we describe constitute the building blocks of modern 
statistical decision theory.
18  No claim of originality is made.  We believe that the 
underlying logic of the framework is something that the great majority of economists do 
or would regard as appealing.  It is also the case that these ideas have periodically 
appeared over time as different economists have attempted to place empirical research on 
a more policy-relevant foundation.
19 Our own discussion will place these ideas in a 
  5context that helps identify some dimensions along which this framework can inform 
theoretical and empirical work on macroeconomic policy analysis.   
  From a decision-theoretic perspective, one thinks of a policymaker as facing a 
choice among a set of outcomes and wishing to use available information, including data 
on the economy, to inform this choice.  As such, the policymaker’s decision is 
interpretable as a standard microeconomic problem of choice under uncertainty.  To 
formalize this idea, suppose that a policymaker must choose a policy, indexed by   from 
some set of possible policies  .  The policymaker has available a data set   (a 
realization from a process with support  ) which may be used to inform the policy 
evaluation.  We initially assume that the policymaker is evaluating policies conditional 
on a given model of the economy,  .  At this level, there is no need to precisely define 
what constitutes a model; typically a model will incorporate a particular economic theory 
or theories as well as various functional form specifications.  While the model of the 
economy could be treated as part of the policymaker’s information set (which would 
mean treating it in a symmetric fashion to  ), it is convenient to separate it from the 
other information he possesses.  Each policymaker has preferences over policy effects 






( ) , lp θ  where θ  represents whatever 
quantities affect the function; the support of these unknowns is Θ.  For example, θ  may 
represent parameters that determine the effects of the policy.  Typically, θ  will include 
innovations to the economy that have not been realized at the time the policy is chosen.  
From the perspective of a policymaker, uncertainty about θ  is the only source of 
uncertainty about the losses of a given policy.  For simplicity, we do not allow the loss 
function to depend on the model; this generalization may easily be incorporated. 
In order to describe the effect of uncertainty over θ  on policy evaluation, it is 
necessary to characterize the policymaker’s preferences as they relate to risk.  We 
initially assume that the policymaker is an expected loss minimizer; alternative 
preference assumptions will be considered later.  Expected loss calculations, in turn, 
require specification of the probabilities associated with different realizations of θ .  
These probabilities are described by the density  ( ) |, dm µθ , so that uncertainty about θ  
  6is conditioned on the available data   and a particular model m of the economy.   The 




  () () ( ) ( ) ,, , , d Elp dm lp dm θ θµθ
Θ =∫ θ  (1) 
 
This type of calculation allows for policy comparisons.  Optimal policy choice may be 
treated as  
  
  ( ) ( ) min , , d pP lp d m θ µθ θ ∈ Θ ∫  (2) 
 
As equations (1) and (2) illustrate, policy analysis is thus straightforward once the 
loss function  ( , lp ) θ  and the probability density ( ) |, dm µθ  are specified.  However, it is 
interesting to observe that the sorts of calculations associated with (1) and (2) are not 
necessarily those that are associated with conventional econometric practice.  This is so 
in three senses.  
First, the relevant uncertainty associated with θ  cannot necessarily be reduced to 
its expected value and associated variance. The entire posterior probability density of θ  
may be relevant.  Of course, as has been understood since the early days of mean 
variance analysis in portfolio theory, there are various assumptions on the structure of 
uncertainty and policymaker preferences under which the second moments are the only 
moments of   that affect policy assessment.  The appropriateness of these 
assumptions will differ from context to context and so should not be assumed without any 
forethought.    
( |, dm µθ )
Second, even if the relevant uncertainty associated with θ  can be summarized by 
its posterior mean and variance this does not provide a clear way of linking policy 
evaluation to hypothesis testing.  For example, consider the way in which various policies 
are evaluated in the empirical growth literature.  Typically, a researcher identifies an 
empirical proxy for a policy and determines whether it is relevant for growth according to 
whether or not it is statistically significant at the 5% level.  This assessment does not 
  7directly speak to the question of whether the policy variable should be changed, even if 
one ignores the question of the costs of such a change.   
  What implications might one draw from these two arguments?  One implication is 
that it is generally more appropriate to report posterior distributions that describe the 
effects of policies on variables of interest, rather than focus on test statistics per se.  The 
relevance of this implication differs across empirical literatures; the monetary policy rule 
literature is very much focused on the evaluation of policy rules with respect to loss 
functions.
20  In contrast, the economic growth literature is very much dominated by 
hypothesis testing as a way to evaluate growth policies; for example the survey of the 
empirical growth literature by Robert Barro and Sala-i-Martin
21 typically equates 
evidence that a policy is relevant for growth with the statistical significance of its 
associated regression parameter.  We will discuss the use of empirical models to evaluate 
growth policies in more detail in Section 6. 
  A third criticism of conventional econometric practice concerns the distinction 
between parameters and estimates of parameters  The uncertainty that is relevant for 
policy evaluation is uncertainty over θ , not uncertainty with respect to estimates of the 
parameter, i.e.  ˆ θ .  Yet most empirical work reports standard errors of estimates rather 
than uncertainty concerning underlying parameters.  This is a standard objection 
Bayesians make of frequentist approaches to econometrics.
22  The import of this criticism 
will differ across contexts.  The reason for this is that for a large range of cases Bayesian 
and maximum likelihood estimates converge, so that the distinction focusing on the 
distribution of parameters versus associated estimates is of second-order importance in 
large samples.
23  We will not focus on this issue further. 
 
   
3. Model uncertainty 
 
The basic framework we have described may be employed to understand how to 
account for model uncertainty.  To see how one would do this, suppose that there exists a 
set  M of possible models of the economy.  We treat the set of possible models as finite; 
allowing for richer model spaces may be done in a straightforward fashion for a number 
  8of contexts.
24  With respect to our previous discussion, the question we now address is 
how to incorporate uncertainty about the appropriate model of the economy when 
evaluating policies.  
One important issue in dealing with model uncertainty concerns whether it should 
be treated in the same way as uncertainty over other unknowns, e.g. parameters or over 
the realizations of future shocks to the economy. For now, we treat all uncertainty 
symmetrically, so that the incorporation of model uncertainty into policy evaluation 
calculations requires only that the policymaker incorporate a probabilistic description of 
model uncertainty into (1) and (2); however, there will turn out to be some dimensions 
along which model uncertainty may warrant a different treatment. 
 
i. Expected loss calculations under model uncertainty  
 
In order to extend our discussion in Section 2 to include model uncertainty, it is 
necessary to modify the description of uncertainty over θ  in such a way that it no longer 
is conditioned on a given model. Put differently, from the perspective of policy 
evaluation, a policymaker will not want to condition decisions on a particular model 
unless one knows that the model is true with probability 1.  Rather, he will want to 
compute expected losses conditioning only on the realized data  .  Relative to the 
expected loss calculation described by (1), accounting for model uncertainty means that 
the expected loss to a policy should be evaluated under the assumption that the model   
is an unknown. This means that when the true model   is unknown, the policy 
evaluation equation (1) should be modified so that the expected loss associated with each 
policy accounts for this; the expected loss associated with a policy that only conditions on 
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dd m µθ µθ µ
∈
= m d ∑  (4) 
 
The term  ( ) d µθ  describes the posterior probability of the relevant unknowns 
conditional on the observed data   and accounting for model uncertainty.  As before, the 
role of econometric analysis is in computing this object.  
d
Eq. (4) illustrates how one can eliminate dependence of expected loss calculations 
on a particular model: one treats the identity of the “true” model as an unobserved 
random variable and “integrates” it out of the loss function and the posterior density for 
unobservables. This technique is known as model averaging in the statistics literature.
25  
The failure to account systematically for model uncertainty is, in our judgment, a 
defect of much current econometric practice.  “Standard” econometric practice consists of 
calculating quantities that are variants of the conditional probability  ( , dm µθ ) .  As we 
have argued, in the presence of model uncertainty, the natural object of interest in policy 
evaluation is
  ( ) d µθ . While it is common practice to evaluate the robustness of 
( , dm µθ )  relative to some set of modifications of a baseline model specification, these 
are typically ad hoc.  In addition, the common practice of reporting results for a set of 
related models in order to show the robustness or nonrobustness of a given finding across 
models does not provide a way of combining information across specifications.  Nor does 
this practice provide a clear way of thinking about nonrobustness.  If a coefficient is large 
in one regression and small in another, what conclusion should be drawn?  The 
calculation of  ( ) d µθ  renders such questions moot, as the information about θ  that is 
contained in each model specification is integrated into its construction.  
In order to understand what is needed to construct  ( ) md µ , it is useful to rewrite 
this conditional probability as 
  








=∝ µ  (5) 
 
  10where “∝” means “is proportional to.”  As eq. (5) indicates, the calculation of posterior 
model probabilities depends on two terms.  The first term,  ( ) dm µ , is the probability of 
the data given a model, and so corresponds to a model-specific likelihood.   The second 
term,  ( ) m µ , is the prior probability assigned to model m.  Hence, computing posterior 
model probabilities requires specifying prior beliefs on the probabilities of the elements 
of the model space M . The choice of prior probabilities for a model space is an 
interesting and not fully understood problem and will be discussed below.  One common 
choice for prior model probabilities is to assume that each model is equally likely. But 
even in this case, the posterior probabilities will not be equal since these probabilities 
depend on the relative likelihoods of each model.    
One can develop some insight into what this approach can accomplish by 
comparing it to the analysis by Andrew Levin and John Williams which is very much in 
the spirit of model averaging.
26 In their paper, monetary policy rules are evaluated when a 
forwards-looking model, a backwards-looking model and a forwards/backwards looking 
hybrid model of output and inflation are each given a probability weight of 1/3; in each 
case the parameters are also assumed known a priori.  The calculation of expected losses 
from policy rules is done using their analog to eq. (3).  Relative to this approach, we 
would argue that the appropriate model weights are not fixed probabilities but rather 
posterior probabilities that reflect the relative goodness of fit across the various models.  
In addition, we would argue that one needs to account for specification uncertainty for 
each of the models Levin and Williams consider.  For example, one would not want to 
assume lag lengths are known a priori.  In other words, model uncertainty occurs at a 
range of levels including both the economic theory that constitutes the underlying logic 
of a model as well as the detailed specification of its statistical structure.  (Our approach 
would also account for parameter uncertainty in the calculation of expected losses, but 
this is a distinct issue from model uncertainty.)    
How does model uncertainty alter the ways in which one thinks about statistical 
quantities?  Suppose that the goal of an exercise is to characterize aspects of an unknown 
quantity δ .  Suppose that one is able to calculate the mean and variance of this object 
conditional on a given model.   In order to compute the mean and variance of δ  without 
  11conditioning on a given model, one uses the posterior model probabilities to eliminate 
this dependence. Following formulas due to Leamer,
27 the mean and variance of δ , once 
one has accounted for model uncertainty are  
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respectively. 
These formulas illustrate how model uncertainty affects a given parameter 
estimate.  First, the posterior mean of the parameter is a weighted average of the posterior 
means across each model.  Second, the posterior variance is the sum of two terms.  The 
first term, ()( ,
mM
md v a r dm µδ
∈ ∑ ) , is a weighted average of the variances for each model 
and directly parallels the construction of the posterior mean.   The second term reflects 
the variance across models of the expected value for δ ; these differences reflect the fact 




md E dm E d µδ δ
∈
− ∑ ,  
is not determined by the model-specific variance calculations and in this sense is new,  
capturing how model uncertainty increases the variance associated with a parameter 
estimate relative to conventional calculations.  The term measures the contribution to the 
variance of δ  that occurs because different models produce different estimates 
( , ) E dm δ .  To see why this second term is interesting, suppose that  () , var d m δ  is 
constant across models.  Should one conclude that the overall variance is equal to this 
same value?  In general, one should not do so.  So long as there is any variation in 
( , ) E dm δ  across models, then  ( ) ( ) , var d m var d δ < δ ; the cross model variations in 
the mean increase the uncertainty (as measured by the variance) that exists with respect to 
  12δ .  As argued by David Draper,
28 this second term explains why one often finds that the 
predictions of the effect of a policy often grossly underestimate the actual uncertainty 
associated with the effect. 
 
ii. Model uncertainty and ambiguity aversion 
 
This analysis of model uncertainty may be generalized to allow for preferences 
that move beyond the expected utility paradigm that underlies equations such as (1).  In 
particular, the framework may be adapted to allow for preference structures that evaluate 
uncertainty about models differently from other types of uncertainty.  Does this 
distinction between sources matter? We would argue that this is an important implication 
of some of the work associated with both the new behavioral economics
29 and with recent 
developments in economic theory.  
One famous example of a behavioral regularity that suggests that individual 
preferences cannot be modeled using standard expected utility formulations is the 
Ellsberg paradox,
30 which is based on the following experiment.  Individuals are asked to 
state their preferences across 4 different lotteries.  For lottery 1, the agent receives a prize 
of   if a red ball is drawn from an urn with 50 red and 50 black balls; lottery 2 is a 
payment of   if a black ball is drawn from the same urn.   Lottery 3 is a payment of $  
for a red ball from a second urn, but where the number of red and black balls is not 
specified.  Lottery 4 is a payment of $  for a black ball from urn 2.  Daniel Ellsberg 
argues that individuals show a consistent preference for lotteries 1 and 2 over either 3 or 
4.  From the perspective of expected utility theory, this is paradoxical as it implies certain 
violations of the Savage axioms that underlie expected utility theory.  For our purposes, 
the Ellsberg paradox is interesting because it suggests a distaste for model uncertainty, in 





A range of experimental studies have confirmed that individual preferences reflect 
a distaste for model uncertainty of the type Ellsberg described.
31  This distaste does not 
appear to be explained either by the possibility that participants in these experiments do 
not understand the rules of conditional probability: Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky
32 
  13found that providing participants with written explanations of why preferring lotteries 1 
and 2 to 3 and 4 is inconsistent with expected payoff maximization does not eliminate the 
paradox.  Further, it does not appear that the distaste for urns with unknown proportions 
reflects a belief that lotteries 3 and 4 are somehow rigged against the participant (in the 
sense, for example, that the composition of the second urn is changed once a payoff rule 
is chosen).
33 It therefore seems that the Ellsberg paradox reflects something about 
individual preferences, not cognitive limitations. 
This type of behavior has been axiomatized in recent work by Larry Epstein and 
Tau Wang and Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler on ambiguity aversion.
34  This work 
has proposed a reformulation of individual preferences so that they reflect a dislike of 
“ambiguity” as well as risk.  In these approaches, distaste for ambiguity means that the 
actor places extra weight on the worst uncertain outcome that is possible in a given 
context.  The theoretical development of models of ambiguity aversion is important in 
showing that ambiguity aversion emerges as a feature of behavior not because of 
cognitive limitations of an actor but rather from a particular formulation of how an actor 
evaluates uncertainty in outcomes.     
The ideas that underlie recent work on ambiguity aversion are directly applicable 
to the formulation of policymaker preferences.  Notice that one essential feature in the 
lotteries that motivate the Ellsberg paradox appears to be the distinction agents draw 
between knowing that an urn has 50 red and 50 black balls versus not knowing the 
proportions of colors, even if one is then allowed to choose which color produces a 
payoff.  This is interpretable as meaning that individuals assess model uncertainty 
differently from uncertainty with respects to outcomes within a model.  While urn 
experiments of course do not directly measure objects that are relevant to policymaker 
preferences, we do believe they suggest that model uncertainty plays a special role in 
such preferences.  
In our context, suppose that a policymaker’s preferences reflect ambiguity 
aversion in the sense that extra weight is placed on the most unfavorable model of the 
economy that may hold, relative to the weight associated with the posterior probability of 
that model.  Following the approach suggested by Epstein and Wang
35, such preferences 
may be formalized through the function 
  14    
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In this expression, e indexes the degree of ambiguity aversion.  When  , this 
expression reduces to our earlier expected loss calculation.  When  , policies are 
evaluated by a minimax criterion:  the loss associated with a policy is determined by the 
expected loss it produces under the worst possible model; good rules are those that 




  Is this type of preference structure relevant to policy analysis?  We argue that it is 
on several levels.  First, the preference structure does reflect the sorts of experimental 
evidence that has motivated the new behavioral economics, and so as a positive matter 
may be useful in understanding policymaker preferences.  Second, we believe this type of 
preference structure reflects the intuition that there exist qualitative differences across 
types of uncertainty.  In particular, we believe that ambiguity aversion is a way of 
acknowledging that one can plausibly argue that there are situations where priors over the 
space of models are not necessarily well enough defined, nor is any version of a 
noninformative prior well enough developed, so that standard expected loss calculations 
can be sensibly made.  And of course, as work by Epstein and Wang and Gilboa and 
Schmeidler has shown, ambiguity aversion is perfectly consistent with rational 
decisionmaking; the expected utility paradigm does not have a privileged position in this 
sense. 
 
iii. Relation to other work 
 
  The approach we advocate to incorporating model uncertainty may be usefully 
contrasted with a number of research programs.   
 
Extreme bounds analysis 
 
  An important research program on model uncertainty originates with Edward 
Leamer and includes a strategy for rendering the reporting of empirical results more 
  15credible.  Leamer’s ideas have been most extensively developed in the context of linear 
regressions.  Suppose that one is interested in the relationship between an outcome   and 
some variable  .  There exists a set 
y
p Z  of other variables that may or may not affect  as 
well.  For each subset of regressors 
y
m Z  (different subsets of Z  correspond to different 
models), one can evaluate the effect of   on   via the regression  p y
 
  , im im m i ypZi δ βε ′ = ++  (9) 
 
Leamer proposes evaluating evidence on the relationship between   and   via the 
distribution of estimates 
p y
ˆ
m δ  across different subsets of control variables.  He argues that a 
benchmark for evaluating the robustness of such inferences is the stability of the sign of 
ˆ
m δ  across different specifications.  Leamer proposes a rule of thumb which stipulates that 
the relationship between   and   should be regarded as fragile if the sign of  x y ˆ
m δ  changes 
across specifications.  
Following work by William Brock and Steven Durlauf,
37 this rule of thumb may 
be given a decision-theoretic interpretation. Suppose that a policymaker is considering 
whether to change  p  from an initial value  p to some alternative  p p >   Suppose that 
conditional on model  , the loss function for the policymaker is  m ( ˆ
m ) p p δ − − .  Leamer’s 
rule means that one will choose to implement the policy if and only if 
() ˆ inf 0 mM m pp δ ∈ −> .  This illustrates how in two respects Leamer’s rule presupposes 
rather special preferences on the part of the analyst.  First, the rule requires that  ˆ
m δ  is a 
sufficient statistic for the policymaker’s payoff function conditional on a particular 
model.  Second, the rule means that the policymaker’s evaluation of risk is described by a 
very particular functional form.  
  Extreme bounds analysis has been subjected to serious criticisms by a number of 
authors.
38  The major criticism of the method, in our reading of the literature, has been 
that Leamer’s procedure is insensitive to the relative goodness of fit of different models.  
We believe this concern is valid: the fact that a model that appears to be grossly 
misspecified produces a different sign for  ˆ
m δ  than is found in a model that does not 
  16appear to be misspecified, intuitively seems a weak reason to conclude that evidence 
concerning δ  is fragile.  This does not, however, mean that Leamer’s deep idea that one 
needs to account for the fragility of regression findings across specifications is invalid or 
that extreme bounds analysis cannot be adapted in a way to respond to the objection. 
Following an argument by Brock and Durlauf,
39 one can modify Leamer’s idea in 
a way that preserves its core intuition.  This becomes apparent when one interprets 
Leamer’s analysis in the context of the ambiguity aversion analysis we described above.  
Specifically, the decision-theoretic version of extreme bounds analysis is a limiting case 
of eq. (8) above where   and  1 e = ( ) ( ) ˆ ,, d m lp d m p θ µθ θ δ
Θ =− ∫ .  This calculation 
makes clear that ambiguity aversion is the key feature underlying extreme bounds 
analysis as a procedure for reporting empirical results.  This implies that if one relaxes 
the requirement that  , one can preserve the ambiguity aversion that lies at the core of 
the extreme bounds method and at the same time address criticisms of the procedure.  In 
particular, for  , the overall effect of a particular model-specific parameter on a 
policy evaluation will be increasing in the model’s posterior probability. 
1 e =
0 e << 1
 
Robust optimal control 
 
In an influential recent body of research, Lars Hansen and Thomas Sargent have 
employed robust decision theory to account for the fact that a policymaker typically does 
not know the true model of the economy.
40  This work has stimulated a growing 
literature.
41 The robust control framework differs from ours in two respects.  First, 
Hansen and Sargent consider model uncertainty that is centered around a “core model.”  
What this means is that they consider environments in which the true model is known 
only up to some local neighborhood of models that surround the core model.  This 
neighborhood set may be small or quite large depending on how the notion of distance 
between models is parameterized.  We will call this type of analysis a local analysis even 
though technically speaking the neighborhood does not have to be small in the usual 
mathematical sense.  
  17Second, Hansen and Sargent do not work with priors on the model space, i.e. 
() m µ . Rather, they engage in minimax analysis, in which the least favorable model in 
the space of potential models is assumed to be the “true” one for purposes of policy 
evaluation; this assumption is in the spirit of Abraham Wald.
42  To put it another way, 
Hansen and Sargent assume that Nature draws a model from the neighborhood set of 
models in order to maximize cost to the policymaker.  They then set their policy rule in 
order to minimize cost while playing such a game against Nature.  In fact, their analysis 
is explicitly based on a two player zero sum game where Nature chooses a model (from a 
set of models centered at a core model) in order to maximize losses to the policymaker 
and the policymaker chooses a policy to minimize losses. 
Our discussion of the decision-theoretic approach to policy analysis is closely 
connected to the Hansen-Sargent research program.  In comparison to our discussion, 
Hansen and Sargent may be interpreted as developing their analysis on the basis of a 
particular way of characterizing the space of potential models (one that possesses 
enormous power because it allows one to bring to bear robust control theory tools) 
combined with a description of policymaker preferences in which  1 e = .  This approach 
reflects a modeling philosophy in which one starts with a well-developed and 
economically sensible core model and explores the implications of allowing for the 




Starting from a single dynamic model, we add perturbations that represent 
potential model misspecifications around that benchmark model. The 
perturbations can be viewed as indexing a large family of dynamic 
models…We prefer to think about the perturbations as errors in a 
convenient, but misspecified, dynamic macroeconomic model.  We take 
the formal structure for perturbations from a source that served 
macroeconomists well before… 
 
Our analysis is motivated by the belief that model uncertainty is, in many 
macroeconomic contexts, associated with the existence of more than one core model that 
potentially describes the phenomenon under study.  Disagreements as to whether 
democratization is necessary for sustained growth or whether business cycles are better 
understood as generated by monetary versus real factors are associated with very 
  18different conceptions of the macroeconomy and constitute a different type of uncertainty 
from the sort for which robust control theory is best designed.  Hence, we favor an 
approach that allows for model uncertainty across a range of core models.
44  As such, it 




…researchers are using many different types of models for evaluating 
monetary rules, including small estimated or calibrated models with or 
without rational expectations, optimizing models with representative 
agents, and large econometric models with rational expectations.  Some 
models are closed economy models, some are open economy models, and 
some are multicountry models…Seeking robustness of…rules across a 
wide range of models, viewpoints, historical periods, and countries, is 
itself an important objective of policy evaluation research. 
 
Our focus on “global” (in this sense) model uncertainty has implications for how 
one thinks about losses. Specifically, if one does not believe that the space of potential 
models is “narrow” in the sense defined by Hansen and Sargent, the minimax approach is 
likely to give highly unsatisfactory results. The reason is that the minimax assumption 
implies that policy evaluation will ignore posterior model probabilities.  Hence a model 
with arbitrarily low posterior probability can determine the optimal policy so as long it 
represents the “worst case” in terms of loss calculations. This does not mean that the 
minimax assumption in Hansen and Sargent is in any sense incorrect, only that the 
appropriateness of a particular strategy for evaluating losses depends on context.  In 
particular, we believe that the minimax strategy is very natural for the study of local 
forms of model uncertainty that are explored in the new robust control approach to 
macroeconomics.  In fact, the minimax approach has proven extremely important in the 
development of robust approaches to policy evaluation, which is arguably the main new 
theoretical contribution of recent macroeconomic research on model uncertainty. In the 
next section, we show how a very localized version of the minimax strategy can be 




  194. Theoretical implications 
  
In this section, we consider some theoretical implications of model uncertainty for 
policy evaluation.  Specifically, we analyze how a preference for policy robustness 
influences the design of policies.  This approach employs minimax preferences in the 
context of analyzing how a policymaker might account for the introduction of model 
uncertainty defined by a local neighborhood of models generated around a benchmark 
model or set of models.  As we have suggested, robustness analysis represents an 
important innovation in the theory of policy evaluation and may be interpreted as an 
approach to accounting for model uncertainty when policymaker preferences reflect 
ambiguity aversion.
46   
 
i. local robustness analysis 
 
We first describe an approach to conducting local robustness exercises in policy 
design.  To do this, recall that the general discussion in Sections 2 and 3 placed primary 
focus on the role of the posterior density of θ ,  ( ) , dm µθ  if the model is known, 
( ) d µθ  if the model is unknown, in allowing a policymaker to evaluate policies.  We 
will initially assume that   is known and ask how perturbations around this initial model 
affect optimal policy choice.  Specifically, we will ask how the optimal policy changes 
with respect to a change in one of the parameters of that density, which we designate as 
m
α .  Let  ()
* p α  denote the optimal policy as a function of this parameter and let 
() (
* , Jp m αα )  denote the value of (2) evaluated at this optimal policy choice.  For 
technical simplicity, we assume that both  ( ) ( )
* , J pm αα  and  ( )
* p α  are both twice 
differentiable.  
To think about robustness we consider how a policy should be chosen when the 
policymaker does not choose it in response to a fixed parameter α  but rather chooses it 
when the parameter is constrained to lie in a neighborhood  [, N ] α α = −∆ +∆ .  Each 
element in this neighborhood defines a different distribution for θ  and thus constitutes a 
  20separate model.  Of course, one cannot specify an optimal policy unless one specifies 
how this parameter is determined.  The key idea behind robustness analysis is to assume 
that this choice is dictated in a way that is least favorable to the policymaker.   
Metaphorically, one can suppose that the policymaker faces an “adversarial agent” (AA) 
who chooses the actual parameter from this interval in order to maximize the loss 
function of the policymaker.  This metaphor captures the idea in robustness analysis that 
one chooses a policy based upon minimax considerations.  A robust policy is one that is 
optimal against the least favorable model in the space of models implied by the 
neighborhood.   
To understand how robustness affects optimal policy choice, we first consider 
how an adversarial agent will choose an element of  .  When  N ∆ is small, one can work 
with the approximation  
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The second equality follows from the envelope theorem.  Hence, the adversarial agent 








, α −∆ otherwise.  
The robust policy response can thus be computed as a response to the action of 
the AA.  It is straightforward to show that the robust policy response to the introduction 
of the AA is
47
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One important feature of these formulas is that they indicate how introducing an 
adversarial agent and considering robustness is different from simply introducing 
uncertainty around a model parameter.  As first shown in the classic work of Kenneth 
Arrow and John Pratt, risk is a second order phenomenon in the sense that starting, for 
example, with consumption at a certain risk free level, the addition of a sufficiently small 
mean zero random variable to this consumption level has no effect on utility.  In our 
context, adding a small amount of uncertainty around α  in the form of a zero mean 
random variable would similarly have no effect on optimal policy.  The introduction of a 
neighborhood of uncertainty around  α  combined with an adversarial agent, in contrast, 









.  The reason is quite intuitive: the presence of the adversarial agent 
ensures the effect on the expected loss to the policymaker from the introduction of the 
neighborhood will never be zero.  Put differently, robustness analysis is predicated on the 
idea that uncertainty cannot be modeled as a mean preserving spread, but rather is 
measured in terms of the bounds of the effects of the uncertainty on changes in payoffs.  
For this reason, robustness analysis is conceptually distinct from conventional risk 
analysis.  
 
application to Brainard 
 
This general discussion can be applied in the context of Brainard’s classic 
analysis of optimal choice of policies in the presence of uncertainty.
48   Brainard’s model 
focuses on the question of how to stabilize (in the sense of minimizing expected squared 
  22deviations) a variable  y  around some objective  y  using two policy instruments  1 p  and 
2 p .  The baseline model for this analysis is 
 
  11 22 yp p θ θε = ++  (12) 
 
where ε  denotes a random variable that captures aspects of  outside the policymaker’s 
influence.  In the context of our loss framework, Brainard’s problem may be written as 
y
 
  () ( )
12
2
(,) 11 22 1 2 1 2 min , , d d pp pp y d m θ θεµ θ θ θ
Θ ++ − ∫ θ  (13) 
 
Following Brainard, it is assumed that ε  is independent of  1 θ  and  2 θ  and that 
.  Letting  () () 12 1 EE θθ == ij σ  denote the covariance of  i θ  and  j θ , Brainard shows that 
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The key insight of these formulas is that policy choices with uncertain effects as 
formulated here render the choice of policies analogous to a portfolio problem such that 
the policy weights are determined by an optimal mean/variance tradeoff.   
  How does a robustness analysis affect these calculations?  In order to do this we 
consider how, starting from fixed parameters, allowing for an adversarial agent to choose 
a parameter from an interval centered on these parameters affects optimal policy. Let  ij σ  
denote the baseline for parameter  ij σ .  Suppose that the adversarial agent chooses the 
  23variance of the first instrument from the interval  11 11 [,] σ σ −∆+ ∆ . Using (13), it is 
straightforward to verify that the AA will choose  11 σ +∆ , since the policymaker’s payoff 
is decreasing in the variance of the policy instrument’s parameter, i.e. the loss is 
increasing in  11 σ . (This follows immediately from the risk aversion built into the 
policymaker’s loss function.) The first order conditions for optimal policy choice may be 
shown to imply   
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  Equations (16) and (17) illustrate several basic ideas.  First, policy 2 is always 
adjusted in the opposite direction to policy 1 if  12 10 σ + >  and in the same direction if 
12 10 σ +< . Recall that the policies have been normalized so that the expected values of 
their effects are 1, i.e.  i θ  has been divided by  ( ) i E θ . This suggests a presumption that 
the policies will be adjusted in opposite directions. 
Second, regardless of the covariance structure of the policy effects, an increase in 
11 σ  leads to a reduction in 
*
1 p .  This makes intuitive sense: the less trustworthy control 
is used less aggressively. Combined with  12 10 σ + > , one has a “precautionary principle” 
for policymakers:  one robustifies against uncertainty in policy 1 by using that policy less 
aggressively and policy 2 more aggressively. 
Third, this discussion illustrates the difference between evaluating the 
introduction of risk and robustness. Suppose that one started with  11 22 0 σ σ ==  and 
began a local increase in the variances.  Following the logic of the Arrow-Pratt theory of 
  24risk aversion, there would not be a first order effect.  The robustness analysis, in contrast, 
does produce a first order effect. 
 
application to monetary policy rule evaluation 
 
  Similar results apply to the question of monetary policy rules.  This can be seen 
using a model by Lars Svensson
49 which represents a one equation version of an 
important output/inflation model due to Glenn Rudebusch and Svensson.
50  In this model, 
t π  denotes the gap between actual inflation and some target,   denotes the gap between 
output and some target, and   denotes an i.i.d. sequence of shocks.  The inflation gap 




  1 tt t ye t π φπ δ + = ++  (18) 
 
where  1 φ = .  This equation is a proxy for the actual policy process, i.e. here the 
policymaker is assumed to be able to control the output gap. The policymaker’s 
preferences are described by the loss function 
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  To see how robustness works for this model, consider the coefficient φ , in (18), 
which is assumed to equal 1 in all periods by Svensson.  Suppose that at time t the 
adversarial agent may select φ  from the neighborhood  [1 ,1 ] N = −∆ +∆  for period t; 
  25there is no such choice for future periods.  One can show that the loss to the policymaker 
is increasing in this coefficient, so the least favorable possible coefficient in   is 1 N +∆. 
(Intuitively, a policymaker prefers less persistence in the inflation process as it 
diminishes the net costs to an expansionary policy today.)  The optimal choice of the 
















which is more aggressive than the original rule.  To understand the difference, robustness 
in this case means that the policymaker needs to react more aggressively when inflation 
experiences a shock due to the potentially explosive dynamics associated with the least 
favorable coefficient  1 φ =+ ∆ .  The locally robust response to this potential for 
explosiveness in the inflation process is to act more aggressively in response to 
deviations of output above target.  This finding is consistent with the intuition when the 
channel from the control variable to the outcome of interest is more “trustworthy” than 
the other determinants of the outcome of interest (the free dynamics of the process) in the 
sense that if one robustifies with respect to those parameters that characterize the free 
dynamics, one will use the control more aggressively.
51
  Alternatively, robustness may be sought with respect to the measure of control 
strength δ , i.e. rather than treat the control strength as a fixed δ , the measure of control 
strength is chosen from the neighborhood [, δδ ] −∆+ ∆  by an adversarial agent.  One 
can show that the least favorable parameter for the policymaker in this neighborhood is 
δ −∆.  This is unsurprising as a smaller value for δ  in (18) implies a steeper Phillips 
curve for the policymaker.  The response to this change will depend on the sign of 
2 k β δ −λ .   If this term is positive, then the policymaker will be more aggressive than 
occurs when there is no desire to make policies robust with respect to δ . In other words, 
the coefficient that relates  t π  to   will be larger than appears in (20).  On the other 
hand, if this term is negative, the coefficient will be smaller than appears in (20).  Why 
does the effect of introducing robustness affect policy responses in this way?  The 
condition   implies that relatively little weight is placed upon output gap 
*
t y
2 0 k βδ λ −>
  26volatility.  This leads the policymaker to react very strongly when output is above target; 
a central bank with such preferences can choose a robust policy strategy to guard against 
uncertain control by becoming more aggressive in moving output back down to target.   




I think it is clear that the Phillips curve and the low estimate of the natural 
rate of unemployment led to the appointment of policymakers with less 
concern about pursuing price stability.  It also probably led to monetary 
decisions – such as delays in raising interest rates when faced with 
inflationary pressures in the late 1960’s and 1970’s – which were 
inconsistent with price stability. 
 
Suppose one interpreted Taylor as saying that policymakers in the late 1960’s and early 
1970’s had high confidence in their Phillips curve slope estimates, i.e. δ  was close to 
zero. As confidence waned and ∆ became larger during the experience of the stagflation 
in the 1970’s, our findings suggest that control would have become more aggressive so 
long as  , which would be consistent with the preferences of an inflation 
“hawk” such as Paul Volcker or Alan Greenspan. 
2 0 k βδ λ −>
  Of course, we do not claim that such a simple model can explain the US monetary 
history over the last 25 years.  We only offer this scenario to illustrate how robustness 
analysis can yield interpretable results.  More generally, we believe that robustness 
analysis is important in allowing one to analyze how “ignorance” affects policy, where 
ignorance is measured using the intervals around parameters. 
 
ii.  robustness with multiple core models 
   
  The analysis of robustness may be extended to the case where there is more than 
one core model.    Abstractly, the analysis of robustness with respect to a parameter α  of 
( ) d µθ  may still be done using formula (11) if  ( ) ( )
* , Jp m αα  is replaced with 
( ) ( )
* , Jpα α  where  
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⎝⎠ ∑ ∫ θ
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⎟  (22) 
 
so that  ()
* p α  now denotes the optimal policy conditional on α  after model uncertainty 
has been accounted for. 
  We will use (22) as the basis for our discussion of robustness with multiple core 
models.  In doing so, we will not address issues of robustness that arise when ambiguity 
aversion is present in the form described by (8), although one can certainly conduct our 
analysis under such preferences. 
  
application to growth economics 
 
In order to see what new insights emerge when one introduces multiple core 
models, we develop a robustness analysis in a growth context. First, we discuss within 
model robustness and then allow for multiple core models. 
Consider a policymaker who is evaluating whether to change a policy variable 
p in order to affect a given country’s growth rate.  We consider the econometric issues 
involved with such a question below; here we wish to deal with some theoretical issues. 
Let model   of the growth process equal  m
 
  , im i mm i im ii gS p p m ν δε δυ ′ =+ + = +  (23) 
 
Here,   denotes all growth determinants other than the policy variable  , im S i p ; different 
models are indexed by different choices of growth determinants. Suppose this regression 
is applied to data in order to produce estimates of the mean and variance of δ  as well as 
the covariance of δ  and υ.   
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How does one design a robust policy strategy to deal with uncertainty in the 
effectiveness of policy parameter  δδ σ ?  Taking  δδ σ  as the value of the parameter without 
uncertainty, following the same line of argumentation used above, the policymaker does 
this by choosing a policy that guards against the least favorable value in the interval 
[, δδ δδ ] σ σ −∆ +∆ .  The least favorable value is  δδ σ +∆ , since the policymaker is 












which means that the robust policy level 
* d p p +  is smaller than  ( )
* p δδ σ  if   and  
* 0 p >
* d
* p p +  is larger than  ( )
* p δδ σ  if 
* 0 p < .  Again, we see that a policymaker who seeks 
local robustness with respect to  δδ σ  will follow a precautionary strategy by being less 
aggressive.  More generally, if a policymaker’s preferences are described by (24), then 
one can show from (25) that the introduction of a desire for robustness implies that 1) 
* p  
is increasing in  () E δ , 2)  
* p  is decreasing in  δδ σ , 3) 
* p  is decreasing in  δυ σ  and 4)  
* p  is decreasing in   if   whereas  r () 0 E δ >
* p  is increasing in   if  r ( ) 0 E δ <  . 
  Relative to these results, in particular eqs. (25) and (26), the introduction of 
multiple core models requires the replacement of model specific versions of  () E δ ,  δδ σ , 
and 
i υ δ σ  by their counterparts as calculated via model averaging, as described by eqs. (6) 
and (7).  Once one replaces the model-dependent moments into (25) with the moments 
described by (6) and (7), one can then proceed with various forms of robustness analysis. 
  Following our earlier discussion, we first focus on the variance of the policy 
variable coefficient.  Let  ,m δδ σ  denote the variance of the policy coefficient conditional 
  29on model  ; the corresponding variance of the policy coefficient when one uses formula 
(7) to eliminate model dependence is 
m
δδ σ . Suppose that an adversarial agent chooses 
,1 δδ σ  from the neighborhood  ,1 ,1 [, δδ δδ ] σ σ −∆+ ∆ .  Letting  ( ) mi µ =  denote the posterior 













=− =  (27) 
 
This means that the least favorable variance for the policymaker is  ,1 δδ σ +∆.  In response, 












= ∆  (28) 
 
This equation is quite intuitive. It says that the policymaker will reduce the level of the 
policy variable and that this reduction is increasing in the degree of risk aversion, r , and 
in the probability of model 1. 
  One can also discuss robustness with respect to the model probabilities.  For 
simplicity, we assume there are only two models.  This allows one to assess robustness 
with respect to   without having to specify where the change in probability for 
this model affects others (in the case of two models, changing the probability of one of 
the models of course means the other changes by an opposite amount.).  Letting   
denote the policymaker’s loss under model 1 and    the loss under model 2, then 














This formula indicates if one is considering robustness with respect to posterior 
model probabilities in the interval  ( ) ( ) 1, 1 mm µµ = −∆ = +∆ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦, the value against which 
one guards will depend on the relative values of   and  .  Suppose that  , so that  1 J 2 J 1 JJ > 2
  30model 1 is preferred by the policymaker, conditional on 
* p  .  In this case, the optimal 
policy response will follow 
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where  denotes the expectation under model  .   m E m
In general, it is unclear whether the change described by eq. (30) is positive or 
negative. However, if   is small, then  r ( ) ( ) ( )
*
12 dpEE δδ ≈ −−∆ , so that if 
() () 12 EE δ δ > , then the policy is used less aggressively when robustness is incorporated 
into the policy construction. 
 
 
5.  Issues in empirical implementation 
 
  In this section we turn from the theoretical side of model uncertainty to a 
discussion of how to incorporate model uncertainty into empirical exercises. This section 
discusses some operational issues; Section 6 will provide some empirical exercises. 
 
i. Bayes, frequentist, or Wald approaches to model evaluation 
 
  From the perspective of empirical analysis, the key objects that must be computed 
are   () , dm µθ  and  ( md µ ) .  These calculations require that a researcher take a stance 
on the use of Bayesian versus frequentist methods. In this section, we describe how this is 
so and show that the basic model averaging idea may be applied in both Bayesian and 
frequentist contexts. 
 
a full Bayesian approach 
 
  31  The basic framework we have described corresponds to the way a Bayesian 
would model a decision problem, once one specifies a way of estimating  () , dm µθ  that 
formally accounts for prior information.  To see this, notice that  
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  () ( ) ( ) ,, dm d m m µθ µ θ µθ ∝  (32) 
 
This latter formulation is the classic Bayes’ rule.  The key idea is that the description of 
uncertainty about θ  given data  , also known as the posterior density, depends on two 
terms: 
d
( , dm µθ) , the probability of the data   given  d θ  and  ( m µθ ) , the probability of 
θ  conditional on model  .  Notice that in our interpretation, this prior density represents 
the uncertainty about 
m
θ  that exists before the data   are realized.  We do not assume that 
these unknowns are necessarily intrinsically random (such an assumption may not be 
appealing when the unknowns are parameters that characterize the economy, but is of 
course natural when the unknowns are shocks).  Rather, the uncertainty about 
d
θ  is 
subjective as it is characterized relative to the policymaker. 
This formulation is what David Lindley
53 has called “The Complete Bayesian 
Paradigm,” concluding 
 
Notice how constructive the paradigm is. It is like a recipe. You only have 
to follow the rules. What do you know?...What is uncertain?...What are the 
possible decisions?…In the coherent system, it is perfectly clear what has 
to be done.  The difficulties are the evaluation of some of the probabilities 
and utilities and the calculation of others… 
 
  Lindley’s distinction between evaluating and calculating probabilities alludes to a 
standard objection to the assumption in Bayesian methods that all uncertainty may be 
  32described (evaluated) in terms of probabilities.  This worry should not be dismissed; 
eminent statisticians such as David Freedman are not Bayesians for this reason.   
However, in our view, the correct response to this objection is to recognize that decisions 
on priors are perfectly defensible on pragmatic grounds.  Eric Leeper, Christopher Sims 
and Tau Zha provide a good example of this and persuasively argue in favor of their use 
of informal methods to place prior restrictions on impulse response functions in order to 
produce plausible results.  As these authors remark:
54
 
We could have accomplished the same, at much greater computational 
costs, by imposing our beliefs about the forms of impulse responses as 
precise mathematical descriptions, but this would not have been any more 
“disciplined.”…There is nothing unscientific or unreasonable about this.  
It would be unscientific or dishonest to hide results for models that fit 
much better than the one presented…or for models that fit about as well as 
the one reported and support other interpretations of the data that some 
readers might regard as reasonable… 
 
  The basic message we wish to communicate is that accounting for model 
uncertainty can be done using standard Bayesian statistical methods. 
 
model uncertainty and frequentist methods 
 
While a full Bayesian approach provides a coherent way of dealing with model 
uncertainty, it does not constitute a unique strategy for doing so.  The basic logic of 
treating the true model as an unknown and accounting for this can be readily adapted to 
frequentist data analyses; we will term this a pseudo-Bayesian approach.  To see this, 
suppose that conditional on model   and data  , a policymaker assigns losses to each 
policy and data combination via some function 
m d
( ) , lp d m.  We interpret this as a 
frequentist loss function; the idea is that given a model and data, one may compute 
sample moments of interest to the policymaker and define losses with respect to them.  
This function may in turn be thought of as a random variable that has been conditioned 
on another random variable, namely model  .  One can therefore eliminate this  m
  33dependence on   using the standard formula for conditional probabilities, i.e. compute 
an expected loss of the form 
m
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While the last term of this expression requires a statement of prior probabilities on the 
model space, it does not require assigning prior probabilities to the unobservables 
contained in θ . From the perspective of frequentist calculations,  ( dm µ )  may be 
approximated by the standard likelihood statistic.
55  
  While an orthodox Bayesian might object to analyses such as (33) using the 
standard critiques of frequentist statistical methods, this is not relevant for our objective 
of providing ways to enhance the utility of empirical analyses of policies.
56  I n  o u r  
empirical applications, we shall use both full Bayesian and pseudo-Bayesian strategies to 




Perhaps the major non-Bayesian approach to decision theory is due to Abraham 
Wald.  In this type of analysis, the focus is on the development of statistical decision 
functions, i.e. the modeling of   which is a mapping from the space of data to the 
space of possible policy choices.  The expected loss for a decision rule depends on the 
unknown 
() pd




  (,) (() ,)( ) d
D R pl p d d θθ µ =∫ d θ  (34) 
  
Policy rules are thus evaluated with respect to their associated risk.  Risk functions, 
however, can only be evaluated conditional on θ .  There are a range of ways to eliminate 
this conditioning when θ  is unknown. If uncertainty about θ  is described by a 
probability density  () µ θ , one can choose  ( ) p d  so as to minimize expected risk 
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  () ( ) () (,) (() ,)( ) d d
D ERp lp d d d θ θµ θ µθ θ
Θ =∫∫ . (35) 
 
By a standard calculation,
58 the evaluation of average risk leads to the same expected loss 
calculation as (1) when one uses the complete Bayesian solution we have described; 
() µ θ  functions as a prior density. 
A meaningful contrast between Wald and Bayesian approaches occurs if instead 
one follows a minimax strategy, i.e. choose  ( ) p d  so as to minimize 
 
  max ( ( ), ) ( )d
Dlpd d d θ θµ θ ∈Θ∫  (36) 
 
Are there cases where the Wald approach can yield useful insights?  The answer reduces, 
in our view, to the question of how one wants to handle priors and so must be handled in 
context.  For example, in the Hansen-Sargent context where model uncertainty is defined 
around a single core model, the minimax strategy seems quite appealing. Similarly, our 
discussion of ambiguity aversion provides a justification for applying the Wald approach 
with respect to cross-model uncertainty regardless of how one evaluates within-model 
uncertainty. 
 
ii. Characterizing model uncertainty 
 
specifying elements of the model space 
 
The specification of a space of possible models is ultimately a matter of a 
researcher’s judgment.  In one trivial sense, this follows whenever two researchers 
disagree on what models should be assigned zero prior probability.  At the same time, our 
general view of disagreements in economics about models suggests that it is useful in 
specifying a model space to consider several distinct levels of model uncertainty and 
build up the space sequentially.  The following levels are, we believe, a useful way to 
structure the building up of a model space. 
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–  Theory uncertainty.  As a rule of thumb, we would argue that model uncertainty 
occurs first because of theory uncertainty.  Continuing disagreements among 
macroeconomists over the degree of price flexibility, the role of rational 
expectations and forward looking behavior in describing individual decisions, etc. 
are a good illustration of the limits to which the current state of economic theory 
can guide a policymaker; and of course, the persistence of disagreements over 
fundamental aspects of the economy reflects the absence of empirical evidence 
that is decisive in adjudicating alternative theories.  At the same time, there are in 
most policy-relevant cases a rich range of alternative theories whose empirical 
analogs can form the first dimension along which to characterize the model space. 
 
–  Specification uncertainty. Once one has specified a range of theories, model 
uncertainty may then be discussed from the perspective of specification 
uncertainty.  Standard examples of specification uncertainty in macroeconomic 
contexts include lag length for vector autoregressions and possible nonlinearities 
in the processes under study.  Another form of specification uncertainty relates to 
measurement. In contexts such as growth economics, there are many empirical 
proxies that have been proposed for a given theory. 
 
–  Heterogeneity uncertainty.  A third level of uncertainty in model specification 
concerns the extent to which different observations are assumed to obey a 
common model.  In business cycle contexts, one needs to determine whether a 
model is rich enough so that data generated during a boom and during a recession 
may be interpreted as realizations from the same model. In growth contexts, one 
needs to determine the extent to which one allows for exceptionalism in the 
experiences of individual countries or regions.  Different specifications of 
heterogeneity in turn produce different models. 
 
   To be clear, these levels of uncertainty are not “natural kinds.”  One can interpret 
heterogeneity uncertainty in many cases as a question of incorporating nonlinearity and 
  36so can be interpreted as a form of specification uncertainty. Our purpose is exclusively to 
indicate some of the judgments that need to be made in constructing a model space. 
 
interpreting a model space 
 
While the specification of a model space is something that may only be discussed 
in the context of a particular economic phenomenon, a distinct issue is whether the 
analysis assumes that the “true” model is an element of the space. Jose Bernardo and 
Adrian Smith
59 distinguish environments that are M-closed and M-open; M-closed 
environments are those where the true model is unknown, but is included in the model 
space; in M-open environments, none of the models under analysis is true. From the 
perspective of model averaging procedures, as the number of observations increase, the 
“true” model will receive an asymptotic weight of 1 (so long as appropriate prior 
coefficient densities are used; see Fernandez, Ley and Steel
60 for discussion); when no 
model is true, that model which best approximates the data (in a particular sense based on 
Kullback-Leibler distance) will asymptotically receive a weight of 1.   
  While the asymptotics of statistical procedures that account for model uncertainty 
are reasonably well understood for both the M-closed and M-open cases, there has been 
relatively little work on the analysis of decision rules in M-open contexts.  Bernardo and 
Smith propose some ways of engaging in statistical decision theory when no model is 
true; they do this in a very special context where the action of the modeler is the choice of 
a model and the objective of the modeler is the prediction of a future observation.  The 
analysis unfortunately does not readily generalize to the sorts of problems which typically 
face economic policymakers, one reason being the question of interpreting 
counterfactuals in light of the Lucas critique; nor does the analysis address the model 
averaging approach we advocate.   
  The evaluation of policies in M-open cases is, in our judgment, an important open 
question.  At the same time, we would note that the concern should not be overstated, at 
least in our context.  Incorporating model uncertainty into policy analysis is the most 
appropriate way, we believe, in minimizing the role of misspecification in distorting 
policy evaluation.  The objective of our model averaging approach is explicitly to treat 
  37alternative models of the economy as potential candidates for the true model and allow 
the data to distinguish between them.  Concerns about the absence of a true model in the 
space of potential models can thus only apply to models which the researcher has failed 
to foresee as a possibility.  (The analysis of decision rules in the presence of unforeseen 
types of misspecification lies at the frontiers of decision theory as it requires thinking 
about decisions when the decisionmaker does not know the support of the uncertainty he 
faces.  While some aspects of this problem have been addressed in recent work in 
economic theory, it is far from well understood.)  Further, since the specification of a 
model space will presumably evolve over time as more information becomes available to 
an analyst, at least asymptotically the assumption that the space is M-closed may not be 
as strong as it first appears.   
 
specifying prior probabilities on models 
 
A final issue in characterizing model uncertainty concerns the construction of 
prior probabilities over models.  The specification of prior probabilities on a model space 
raises many conceptual issues. Some of these issues are related to the general questions 
concerning the nature of prior probabilities that continue to be debated in Bayesian 
contexts.  Our own views in this regard are pragmatic.  Desiderata in the assignment of 
priors include, in our view 
 
–  informativeness with respect to the likelihood. Priors should assign relatively 
high probability to those areas of the likelihood that are relatively large.   




–  robustness. A prior should be robust in the sense that a small change in the prior 
should not induce a large change in the posterior.  As argued by James Berger,
62 
robustness may be interpreted as a safeguard against misspecification of prior 
information. 
 
  38–  ability to serve as benchmark. Priors should be flexible enough to allow for 
their use across similar studies and thereby facilitate comparability of results. 
 
Of course, these obviously desirable properties leave a great deal of discretion to a 
given researcher.  And one can easily add other desiderata to our list.  The arguments 
made by Leeper, Sims, and Zha,
63 described above, suggest that “reasonableness of 
results” should be included.  This lack of algorithmic precision in the assignment of 
priors is in our view appropriate; priors ultimately are at least partially a nuisance whose 
choice should be regarded as nothing more than facilitating the presentation of salient 
features of the data. 
How do these simple principles apply to the model uncertainty context?  At first 
glance, it might seem that if one does not have such information, one should assign equal 
prior weight to each element of M.   However, this is not entirely satisfactory as it ignores 
interrelations between different models.   
The problem is easiest to see in the case of linear regression models.  Suppose that 
one is considering model uncertainty where different models correspond to different 
choices of which control variables to include in a linear regression.  This is the problem 
described in the context of eq. (9) and one to which we will return in the context of 
growth econometrics in Section 6.  The recent efforts to employ model averaging to 
account for uncertainty with respect to variable inclusion
64 generally assume that the 
possible models are all equally likely a priori.  So, in the case of linear regressions where 
there is uncertainty over which of K  regressors are present, each of the 2
K  models in the 
model space is assigned probability 2
K − .  This is equivalent to assuming that the 
probability that a given variable is present in the “true” model is equal to .5 and is 
independent of the presence or absence of any of the other regressors in the model.   
Proposals have been made to alter the probability of variable inclusion in order to give 
greater weight to models with a small number of regressors,
65 as well as to assume the 
probability that a given variable is included is itself a random variable drawn from some 
distribution, thereby allowing different variables to be included with different 
probabilities,
66 but the independence assumption is, at least in our reading, essentially 
universal. 
  39As argued by Brock and Durlauf,
67 such a formulation of priors on the model 
space is difficult to justify.  The growth theory that the rule of law affects growth may be 
logically distinct from the theory that property rights affect growth, but that does not 
mean that the fact one matters has no implications for the likelihood that the other does.  
This problem is thus closely related to the red bus/ blue bus paradox that appears in 
discrete choice theory.  The discrete choice question is how the probability an individual 
chooses a red bus or a taxi is affected by the addition of the possibility of using a blue bus 
as well. Under the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumptions of a logit model, 
the presence of the blue bus should not affect the ratio of the choice probabilities between 
a red bus and a taxi; this is an unappealing feature since the blue bus is a far closer 
substitute to the red bus than the taxi.  The discrete choice literature has proposed a 
number of ways of addressing these types of issues, including nested logit models, which 
organize choices in a tree structure that reflects similarities (modeled in the nested logit 
context as common utility components). We will use an analogous approach in defining 
model probabilities in the applications we take up next.  
  
 
6. Empirical applications   
 
i. Monetary policy rules 
 
Our first example concerns monetary policy rules and is designed to illustrate a 
way of integrating model uncertainty using frequentist (or what we called pseudo-
Bayesian) methods.  The last decade has seen an explosion of research on alternative 
policy rules, much of it stimulated by the seminal work by John Taylor on what is now 
called the Taylor rules.  In this section, we present some results on Taylor rules and 
model averaging.  For simplicity, we use a conventional loss function that is quadratic in 
output, inflation and interest rates; assume monetary policy is constrained to follow a 
Taylor rule; further, we only consider backward looking models.  We compute robust 
estimates of the effects of alternative choices of monetary policy parameters.  We 
contrast those estimates with those of the well-known Rudebusch and Svensson model.
68
  40Model uncertainty has played a prominent role in recent analyses of monetary 
policy.  An early example is Bennett McCallum’s analysis of normal income rules, which 
experimented with alternative Phillips curve specifications in order to establish 
robustness across results.
69  The same concern with robustness appears in a number of 
papers in the Taylor volume, and in recent papers such as Levin and Williams.
70  Like 
much empirical research, this literature typically proceeds on the intuition that the set of 
estimates produced will bracket the actual effect of a policy under consideration (or, more 
modestly, is likelier to bracket the effect than is a set produced by extrapolating results 
from a single model). 
As explained above, what we offer is a procedure for formally combining the 
estimates from a set of models.  In this section, estimates are weighted by the 
corresponding model’s likelihood (adjusted for degrees of freedom) and by prior model 
probabilities.  We set these prior probabilities equal for all models, so weights are simply 
the model likelihood: well-fitting models get more weight than do ill-fitting models.  We 
view our approach as a complement rather than replacement for that described in the 
previous paragraph.  Formal model combination will help focus attention on a central 
tendency across models.  But economists and policymakers will still find it useful to 
answer the question, “if one puts prior weight of unity on one or another model, what is 
the risk?” 
The approach that we have proposed is well suited to consider what may be the 
central source of such uncertainty in monetary policy analysis, namely, the modeling of 
expectations.  We share the view of many economists that explicit modeling of 
expectations is relatively important when one is considering the effects of a permanent 
change in regime, say a switch to inflation targeting.  Models with an atheoretical lag 
structure are relatively appealing if one wants to think about the tradeoff between (say) 
raising interest rates 50 basis points this month, or 25 basis points this month and 25 basis 
points next month, when either action is within the framework of how monetary policy is 
currently conducted.  Our approach naturally accommodates this view, by allowing one 
to choose model weights (choose ( ) m µ ’s) that vary with the question at hand. 
In this first analysis, however, we limit ourselves to models in which expectations 
are backward looking.  Indeed, we abstract from simultaneity of any sort even that 
  41associated with Cowles Commission style simultaneous equations models.  With various 
definitions of “robust,” but also with the use of quadratic preferences, Taylor rules and 
backward looking models, calculations similar to ours have been supplied by Alexei 
Onatski and James Stock and Onatski and Noah Williams.
71  The research presented here 
is intended to both complement this work and to illustrate the frequentist approach to 
model averaging (eq. (33)) in a simple context. 
We employ the same notation as Section 4:    is the output gap;  t y t π  is the 
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= ∑ t j i .  We assume that policymakers wish to minimize 
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Following the literature, R  is referred to as a measure of the risk of a policy.  We do not 
attempt to link parameters to a particular microeconomic model,
72 nor do we allow the 
weights to vary across specifications. 
We consider three equation models for  ,  , and  t i t y t π   Our specification assumes 
that the output gap and inflation rate are predetermined. The nominal interest rate is 
determined by a Taylor rule 
 
  1 tt y t i ig g yg i π t π − = ++ (38) 
 
In (38) and elsewhere we suppress constants and all other deterministic terms.   
We consider models in which the output gap   and quarterly inflation  t y t π  depend 
on up to four lags of i,  y , and π .  We label the equation with   on the left hand side as 
the IS curve and the equation with 
t y
t π  on the left hand side as the Phillips curve.  The 
right hand side of the IS equation always includes at least one lag of   and one lag of an 
annual or quarterly ex-post real interest rate, although we do not in all specifications 
constrain coefficients on nominal interest rates and inflation to be equal and opposite.  
y
  42The right hand side of the Phillips curve equation always includes at least one lag of 
inflation and one lag of output, with the lags of inflation constrained to sum to unity.  The 
most profligate specification entailed four lags of i,  , and  y π  in both equations, which 
was almost but not quite an unrestricted VAR (“almost” because lags of inflation in the 
Phillips curve were always constrained to sum to 1). 
Specifically, we varied lags across specifications as follows. In the IS curve, we 
included specifications of two types.  First, we constructed specifications with a single 
lag of the annual ex-post real interest rate  1 t 1 i t π − − −  along with alternative lags for  y  of : 
lag 1, lags 1-2, lags 1-3, and lags 1-4; lags for π  of:  none, lag 1, lags 1-2, lags 1-3 and 
lags 1-4; and lags for i of: none, lag 1, lags 1-2, and lags 1-3. This set of   
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The first two terms on the right hand side of (39) were included in all regressions.  The 
terms in the brackets describe the additional regressors.  Additional IS specifications 
were obtained with models that are identical to those we have just described, except that a 
single lag of the quarterly ex-post real interest rate,  1 tt i π − − − , was always present, with 
lags of i adjusted to prevent linear dependence in the regressors in particular versions of 
(39).  This also produces   specifications.  454 ××
  In the Phillips curve, specifications included lags for  y  of: lag 1, lags 1-2, lags 1-
3, and lags 1-4; lags for π  of: lag 1, lags 1-2, lags 1-3, and lags 1-4; and lags for i of 
none, lag 1, lags 1-2, lags 1-3 and lags 1-4.  This set of 445 × × specifications may be 
written 
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Once again, the first two terms on the right hand side of (40) were included in all 
regressions and the terms in brackets describe the additional regressors. 
Each of the regressions we have described was estimated alternately with a 
constant term as the only deterministic component and with a constant term as well as a 
  43post-1984:I dummy.  The dummy is intended to crudely allow for changes initially 
documented by Margaret McConnell and Gabriel Perez-Quiros
73.  Thus the total number 
of specifications is  () ( ) () 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 2 25,600 ×× + ×× ××××=  where the final “2” 
accounts for the two sets of deterministic terms. 
In all computations, we discarded specifications whose estimates implied 
behavior that was nonstationary.  Mechanical processing of such estimates would yield 
unbounded variances and infinite risk.  Our view is that in a full treatment such estimates 
should be dampened to yield finite variance and risk, in accordance with our prior 
knowledge that the output gap and inflation are stationary.  Discarding the estimates was 
done for simplicity.
74   
For each model, we estimate the IS and Phillips curves by least squares.  In 
conjunction with choices of   in (38), one can compute estimates of the 
total loss described by (37) using point estimates of the variances implied by the model. 
For model m, we refer to this estimated loss as  .  For each model, we compute a BIC-
adjusted likelihood, call it  .  We compute model average risk as 
































 the role of  ( ) dm µ  in eq. (33), under the assumption that 
all models have equal prior probabilities, i.e.  ()
1
25,600
m µ = . 
To clarify and illustrate the effects of model averaging, we contrast the model 
averaging results with those of one well-known special case of the class of models 
considered.  This is the Rudebusch and Svensson model.
75  In this model, the IS equation 
is 
 
  44  11 22 11 1 () ty t y t r t t yy y i t u α ααπ −−− − =++− +  (42) 
 
and the Phillips Curve equation is 
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For a range of values of parameters  y λ  and  i λ  in the risk function (37), we solved 
for Taylor rule parameters that were optimal under Rudebusch and Svensson.  We 
computed risk according to the Rudebusch and Svensson model, denoted as  , as well 
as according to all other models in the model space we have described. The model 
specific risk calculations were then averaged according to (12) to produce average model 
risk.  The objective of this exercise is to see whether the Rudebusch and Svensson figures 
for risk well match those for model averages.  The range of values for the risk parameters 
were those suggested by Levin and Williams,
ˆ
RS R
76  { } 0.0,0.5,1.0,2.0 y λ =  and   
{ } 0.1,0.5,1.0 i λ = , 12 sets of values in all. 
Apart from lags, the sample is 1969:I-2002:IV.  Inflation is computed as 
annualized growth in the GDP deflator, the output gap is computed from real GDP and 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimate of potential GDP.  We used the latest 
data available, thus abstracting from possible complications from data revision. 
Results are in Table 1.  Columns ( gπ ), ( ) and ( ) give values of the Taylor 
rule parameters  that are optimal under Rudebusch and Svensson, found by a grid search.  
These display a familiar and intuitive pattern.  Higher weights on output volatility (higher 
y g i g
y λ ) lead to higher optimal  , higher weights on interest rate volatility (higher  y g i λ ) lead 
to higher optimal  .  As has been found in previous studies of the Rudebusch and 




  45For the Taylor rule parameters given in the Table, we compute model average risk 
ER based upon eq. (41) and compare it to the Rudebusch-Svensson risk  .  In 
principle, model average risk can be higher or lower.  And indeed we see that the last 
column of Table 1 includes both negative and positive values, with positive values 
indicating that model average risk is higher.  Relative to Rudebusch-Svensson risk, model 
average risk tends to be high where there is a relatively small penalty to interest rate 
volatility and low when there is a large interest rate penalty.  While the last column figure 
in the first line of the Table is quite large, the other numbers are much smaller and 
scattered fairly evenly around zero. 
ˆ
RS R
We take this as illustration of two points.  First, upon comparing our results with 
those of Levin and Williams,
77 it seems that there is substantially less variation in risk 
within the class of backwards models we have studied than there is between backward 
and forward looking models.  Specifically, findings for the Rudebusch-Svensson baseline 
is generally representative of the risk associated with the monetary policies considered in 
the table.  Second, and potentially more useful from the perspective of future research, is 
one emphasized in our discussion above: model averaging allows tractable accounting for 
the effects of model uncertainty. 
 
ii. economic growth 
 
  In our second application, which will follow the full Bayesian approach we 
discussed in Section 5, we turn to the empirical growth literature.  Our analysis will focus 
on the evaluation of the effect of tariffs on economic growth.  In order to develop the 
empirical exercise, we first discuss some general issues in growth econometrics.
78   
 
growth econometrics: general issues 
 
Much of recent macroeconomic analysis has focused on issues associated with 
economic growth. The empirical basis for much modern growth research is the now 
classic cross-country growth regression.
79  From the vantage point of using such 
regressions to evaluate a growth policy  p , a canonical form of this regression is 
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  ii i i gX Z p i β γδ ε ′ ′ = +++  (44) 
 
where  is real per capita growth across some fixed time interval,  i g i X  is a set of 
regressors suggested by the Solow growth model (initial population growth, 
technological change, physical and human capital savings rates transformed in ways 
implied by the model),  i Z  is a set of additional control variables suggested by new 
growth theories,  i p  is the policy variable of interest, and  i ε  is an error.  The importance 
of such regressions in policy analyses is summarized by Edmond Malinvaud
80
 
If large cross-sections of country experiences are interesting, it should 
mainly be because they ought to reveal the global impact of other growth 
determinants than the proximate factors of increases in productivity, 
factors about which we have other sources of evidence.  Policy-oriented 
macroeconomists pay particular attention to the various components of 
government interventions…  
 
  Regressions such as (44) have been used to evaluate many policies: a survey of 
this type of empirical work may be found in Barro and Sala-i-Martin.
81  For our purposes, 
the main point is that the evaluation of a growth policy typically amounts to assessing the 
statistical significance of δ  for a baseline specification (44) and a small set of alternative 
specifications which typically amount to changing the variables that are included in  i Z .  
Such analyses pay only indirect attention to the question of the space of models and how 
to evaluate differences across models in drawing conclusions about parameters of 
interest. 
  From the perspective of evaluating growth policies, this standard approach may 
be faulted using arguments we have developed.
82  One problem is that the choice of 
control variables to include as components of  i Z  is typically very ad hoc. A survey by 
Durlauf and Danny Quah
83 found nearly as many alternative growth theories and 
associated empirical measures as there are countries in the standard data sets; by now the 
number of theories exceeds the number of countries. This plethora of alternative theories 
  47is particularly worrisome because, following Brock and Durlauf,
84 growth economics 
suffers from theory openendedness.  Theory openendedness means that one growth 
theory typically has no logical connection to the empirical possibility of another.  The 
theory that political stability affects growth is compatible with any number of other 
theories, such as the claim that the composition of natural resources affects growth.  
Second, empirical growth research has generally not dealt systematically with 
questions of heterogeneity in the growth processes for different countries. Regressions 
such as (44) are interpretable for policy evaluation only to the extent that one believes 
that the regression specification is sufficiently rich that the data from each country 
constitutes a draw from the common statistical model defined by the regression.  While 
this requirement is hardly unique to growth contexts, its plausibility is particularly 
questionable when one is working with such complicated objects as national economies.  
To be concrete, suppose that one wishes to advise a country on some policy using a 
cross-country regression as a source of empirical evidence.  Does one believe that the 
growth implications of a unit change in a given policy variable is the same for the United 
States as countries in sub-Saharan Africa?  It is easy to think of cases, for example 
changes in the percentage of high school graduates in the labor force, where one would 
not wish to make such an assumption, but this is precisely what is asserted when one uses 
(44) to uncover growth determinants.
85
There are a number of studies
86 that have documented parameter uncertainty of 
various forms.  The sorts of parameter heterogeneity that have been identified have often 
been interpreted to indicate how different stages of socioeconomic development are 
associated with different growth processes. Even if one does not believe that the 
empirical case for parameter heterogeneity has been established, there is certainly enough 
such evidence to allow for the possibility in policy evaluation exercises.
87  
A third problem is that it is far from clear that statistical significance can provide 
a useful guide to policy evaluation.  While the abstract argument was made in Section 2, 
it is particularly salient in the growth context and so we expand upon it.  Suppose the 
purpose in using linear growth regressions is to evaluate whether country i should make 
the policy change from  p  to  p .   As we have suggested earlier, standard practice in the 
growth literature is based on the use of the t-statistic associated with  ˆ δ  to evaluate the 
  48policy.  Following Brock and Durlauf,
88 one can think about t-statistics rules from a 
decision-theory perspective. A simple way to do this is to interpret a t-statistic rule as 
implying that, when comparing  p  versus an alternative policy  p p > , one will only 
move from  p  to  p  if the associated  -statistic for the policy parameter  t δ  is greater than 
2.  Further, interpreting a t-statistic as the ratio of the mean of the parameter to its 
standard deviation, one can approximate the  -statistic rule as implying that one makes 
the policy change based upon 
t
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with the policy change taken only if the value of (45) is less than 0.  (If we are 
considering a reduction in the policy variable, the requirement would be that (45) is 
greater than 0; this will be relevant when we consider the question of a tariff reduction.)  
This is a special preference structure in two senses.  First, it assumes that one’s 
evaluation of the policy depends on the effect of the policy on growth and not on growth 
itself.  Second, it assumes a very particular tradeoff between the mean and variance of the 
policy effect.
89
  This interpretation of the t-statistic rule may also be used when one has averaged 
across models; one simply computes the formula using moments on the right hand side of 
(45) that are conditioned on the data   but not on a specific model  .  We will use this 
below to facilitate comparisons between policy advice for different models and model 
averaging.    
d m
 
evaluating a policy of tariff reduction to enhance growth 
 
  In order to show how one might address these problems we consider a particular 
policy question: should the countries of sub-Saharan Africa
90 lower tariffs in order to 
improve growth performance?  Our analysis is obviously a caricature of the actual policy 
process as it ignores the plethora of information that is available to organizations such as 
the World Bank that help inform policy decisions, but for expositional purposes we treat 
cross-country growth regressions as the sole basis on which policy decisions are made.  
  49  In order to evaluate this policy question, we proceed as follows.  First, we define a 
set of different growth theories that have been proposed in the empirical literature. This 
constitutes a first level of model uncertainty.  Second, for each theory, there is 
uncertainty as to which empirical proxies to employ to capture it.  Third, we allow for 
uncertainty concerning whether sub-Saharan Africa countries obey the same growth 
process as the rest of the world. 
  With respect to theory uncertainty, we proceed as follows.  In every model, we 
include the variables predicted by the Solow growth model and our tariff variable.  With 
respect to eq. (44), this means that every element in the model space contains  i X  and 
i p .
91  We then introduce six possible additional categories of theories of cross-country 
growth differences that have received prominence in the literature:  1) exchange rate 
policies, 2) government spending policies, 3) inflation, 4) characteristics of the economic 
system, 5) characteristics of the financial system, and 6) characteristics of the political 
system.  The first three categories, roughly speaking, represent theories that relate various 
government policies to economic growth.  The second three categories represent theories 
that link growth to longer run structural aspects of a country’s economic and political 
system. While these categories do not exhaust the range of new growth theorizing, we do 
argue that they contain a relatively comprehensive range of new growth theories. 
The construction of this first stage of the model space for cross-country growth 
behavior requires a number of decisions on the part of the analyst.  One decision concerns 
the ways in which alternative theoretical specifications are defined.  We interpret each 
theoretical specification for a growth model as the choice of a set of theories to include in 
a growth regression.  We therefore rule out combinations of theories as would occur if 
one were to use the space of empirical growth proxies to recombine elements as is done 
in factor analysis.  Such alternative approaches are not, in our view, interpretable as 
growth models.  However, there may be an argument for doing so in policy evaluation 
contexts, if one is indeed interested only in posterior distributions of policy effects; we 
defer this consideration to future work.  Further, even if one restricts oneself to distinct 
theories, there are questions of how to organize variables into distinct theoretical 
categories. Our choices for distinct growth theories have been made in a way that we 
believe minimizes the connections across theories in the sense that one can treat the 
  50probabilities of each theory being included as approximately independent.  This is 
admittedly a judgment call, but is no different from the judgments often necessary to 
implement models such as the nested logit.
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Second, once one has specified a set of theories, it is necessary to specify how the 
various theories are characterized empirically.  For each theory, we have identified a 
small number of variables that have been employed in the empirical growth literature to 
capture the theory; these various data series are defined in the Data Appendix.  For each 
of these sets of variables, we allow each non-empty subset to correspond to a way of 
empirically modeling the theory.  For example, for the theory that political structure 
affects growth, we have two empirical proxies: civil liberties, and an index of democracy. 
There are three different nonempty subsets of these variables that may be used to 
empirically instantiate the theory.  Each subset choice corresponds to a distinct growth 
model.  
Third, we model parameter heterogeneity in a way that allows us to treat it as a 
variable inclusion problem.  Specifically, we use a very standard procedure in empirical 
work in that models with parameter heterogeneity will take the form 
 
  ,,, , i i i i i i SSA i i SSA i i SSA i gX Z pX Z p β γδβ ξγ ξδ ξε ′′ ′ ′ =+ + + + + +  (46) 
 
where  , i SSA ξ  is an indicator variable that equals 1 if country   is in sub-Saharan Africa 
and 0 otherwise.  This type of heterogeneity has proven useful in previous work on sub-
Saharan Africa, cf. Brock and Durlauf, which found, reexamining an important study by 
William Easterly and Ross Levine that the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on growth are 
much stronger for Africa than for the rest of the world.
i
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  Figure 1 illustrates our formulation of model uncertainty for growth regressions. 
The first level of uncertainty that must be resolved in defining a particular model 
concerns the set of growth theories to include in the specification.  The second level of 
uncertainty that must be resolved is which empirical proxies for these theories are used.  
Once a set of theories and associated empirical proxies are specified, the final level of 
uncertainty that must be resolved is whether sub-Saharan Africa obeys a different growth 
process from the rest of the world or not.  If one were to enumerate every sub-branch for 
  51Figure 1, the final nodes would denote the universe of possible models. The levels of the 
tree indicate the levels at which we assign model probabilities; at each level probabilities 
are assigned equally to all possible branches.  This procedure partially addresses the red 
bus/blue bus problem we described earlier.   
This tree structure provides the basis on which we assign probabilities. With 
respect to theory inclusion, we assume that the inclusion probabilities are equal and that 
the theory inclusion probabilities are unaffected by what additional theories are included.  
This means, for example, that the probability that the “exchange rate” theory of growth 
appears in a model is independent of whether the “political structure” theory of growth is 
included in that model.  Second, we assigned equal probability weights to each of the 
possible empirical analogs of a theory (i.e. to each combination of variables used to 
measure the theory). Third, for each specification of theories and associated variables, we 
specify versions with and without sub-Saharan African heterogeneity.  Models with 
heterogeneity correspond to eq. (46); we allow the error variances for SSA countries to 
differ from the rest of the world.  For each pair of corresponding models with and without 
heterogeneity, we assign probabilities   to the heterogeneous model and 1  to the 
homogeneous model.   For expositional purposes, we report 
q q −
0 q = separately.  Overall, 
there are 4096 different models generated by theory and regressor choice uncertainty; 
allowing for heterogeneity uncertainty doubles this to 8192. 
This tree structure for the probabilities represents an effort to address the problem 
in previous work
94 that two empirical proxies for the same theoretical property are treated 
in the same way as two proxies for different theories in terms of their joint probabilities 
of inclusion.  Our approach is designed to distinguish the questions of uncertainty over 
theories from questions of uncertainty concerning empirical proxies.  While our approach 
is, we believe, an improvement on previous ways of assigning prior probabilities, we 
fully expect that it will evolve in future work.
95  
  In order to compute posterior densities, for the parameters and associated 
expected growth levels in the models defined by (44) and (46), it is necessary to specify 
prior distributions on the model coefficients and a distribution on model errors.  We 
assume a uniform prior on the coefficients and a Gaussian error distribution.  As 
explained in the appendix, this has the important benefit that the posterior expected value 
  52of the regression coefficients in a given model may be approximated by the OLS estimate 
of the parameters, and the posterior variance may be approximated by the OLS estimate 
of the parameters’ variance covariance matrix.  This makes our results straightforward to 
interpret from a frequentist perspective.  However, we wish to be clear that this choice of 
priors is made primarily for expositional clarity; see Fernandez, Ley and Steel
96 for an 
extensive discussion of the appropriate use of priors in linear model averaging contexts. 
  Table 2 reports the results of our estimates of the posterior mean and standard 
deviation for the tariff parameter under a range of specifications.  The tariff variable 
measures tariffs on intermediate goods and inputs and corresponds to OWTI in the 
standard Barro and Lee data set.  Column (OLS) reports OLS estimates of the tariff 
variable based on regressions that include the Solow variables and the tariff variable. 
Column (Full OLS) reports OLS estimates when all possible variables are included.   
Columns (BMA) report Bayesian model averaging exercises under different theory 
inclusion probabilities  , we consider  q .25, .5, and .75 q =  respectively. Columns (Min 
Coefficient) and (Max Coefficient) report estimates for all models estimated in the BMA 
analysis that produce the minimum and maximum posterior means of the parameter.   
Columns (Min Mean +2σ ) and (Max Mean +2σ ) report the results for the analogous 
models whose payoffs under the t-statistic rule eq. (45) are minimal and maximal.  The 
OLS regressions are included to serve as benchmarks in indicating where model 
averaging matters.  (Recall that under our assumption, the OLS regression estimates of 
coefficient and associated standard errors correspond to the posterior means and standard 
deviations of the parameters, thus the OLS regression is a degenerate model averaging 
exercise, i.e. one where all prior model probability is assigned to one model. Columns 
(Min Coefficient) through (Max Mean +  2σ )  are useful in understanding how data 
mining and ambiguity aversion may be evaluated. 
  Table 2 indicates that estimates of the posterior densities of the parameters 
associated with the tariff variable are each very robust with respect to model uncertainty.  
The alternative probabilities of theory inclusion in Columns (BMA) have very little effect 
on posterior means and standard deviations. Relative to the OLS regressions in Columns 
(OLS) and (Full OLS), the model averaging estimates of the mean of the tariff parameter 
is more than 10% higher than the narrow Solow model and about 3% larger than the 
  53expanded Solow model.  For the standard deviation, our model averaging estimates are 
about 10% smaller than the narrow Solow model and similar to our estimate for the 
expanded Solow model.   Notice that in each case the tariff variable is negative with a 
standard deviation less than half the size of the coefficient; by the “t-statistic” loss 
function described by eq. (45), these regressions would support the recommendation of a 
tariff reduction.  Overall, the support for the policy change under these preferences is 
somewhat stronger when the posterior probabilities are computed using model averaging 
versus the OLS model.  To be clear, the model averaging analysis does not lead to a 
different view of the policy advice suggested by the two OLS specifications. Its value 
added comes in showing that this advice is not an artifice of the choice of specification. 
  One can compare the model averaging results to those obtained under models that 
are singled out because they are particularly favorable or unfavorable for a policymaker 
with t-statistic preferences.  If the policymaker is risk neutral, Column (Min Coefficient) 
reports the model that would provide the strongest support for a tariff reduction as it has 
the smallest parameter.  A policymaker with t-statistic preferences would find the model 
described in Column (Min mean +  2σ ) most favorable.  We call these cases data mining 
models because an advocate of a tariff reduction would want to use these specifications in 
an effort to persuade the policymaker to implement the reduction.  A policymaker who 
possessed an ambiguity aversion parameter  1 e =  but only cared about the mean of the 
parameter conditional on a model would make a policy evaluation on the basis of the 
model described in Column (Max Coefficient) whereas an ambiguity averse policymaker 
with  -statistic preferences conditional on a model would evaluate a tariff reduction on 
the basis of the model described in Column (Max Mean + 
t
2σ ) .    
These results indicate that the policy recommendation that is implied by the OLS 
and model averaging exercises is similar to that which is implied by the data mining 
models.  This occurs because models in the vicinity of the data mining models are 
associated with relatively large posterior probabilities.  So, in this sense the support for 
the reduction is strengthened.  In contrast, an extremely ambiguity averse agent will find 
the evidentiary support for the reduction to be far weaker.  However, if the policymaker 
is risk neutral within a model, he will still conclude that the reduction is justified.  The 
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differential between the status quo and the reduction is not particularly large.   
Table 3 extends our analysis to allow for heterogeneity between sub-Saharan 
Africa and the rest of the world.  We report OLS estimates for (44) for the tariff 
parameter from regressions based on 1) the Solow variables plus tariffs and 2) the Solow 
variables, tariffs, and all other variables in Columns (OLS) and (Full OLS) respectively. 
For the model averaging analysis, we focus on the case where the theory inclusion 
probability is .5 and consider prior probability weights on models with heterogeneity and 
corresponding models without heterogeneity to equal .5, .75, and 1 respectively.  These 
results appear in Column (BMA Prior Heterogeneity Probabilities). 
  Column (BMA Prior Heterogeneity Probabilities) indicates a significant 
discontinuity in the mean and standard deviation of the tariff parameter for   versus 
the other cases.  In particular, the first two moments of the parameter are similar to those 
found in Table 2 for   and 
1 q =
.5 q = .75 q = ; allowing for heterogeneity slightly lowers the 
posterior mean and raises the posterior standard deviation by about 20% for the prior 
heterogeneity probability of .5 and by about 50% for the prior heterogeneniety 
probability of .75. In contrast, the posterior mean and standard deviation for   are 
very different; the mean is nearly doubled and the standard deviation is about 4 times as 
large as found for the model averaging counterparts in Table 2.  The reason for the large 
differences is that the posterior probabilities on the subset of models that allow for SSA 
heterogeneity are very small.  When 
1 q =
.5 q = , the total posterior probability on models with 
heterogeneity is only .014; for  .75 q = , the posterior probability is only .04.  As a result, 
these models have relatively little effect on the overall posterior density of the tariff 
parameter.  In contrast,   imposes heterogeneity on all models.  This leads to the very 
different estimates that would, by preferences such as (45), lead a policymaker to advise 
against a tariff reduction. Our other regression exercises also lead to a rejection of the 
tariff reduction under preferences (45). In both of the Solow cases, if SSA heterogeneity 
is included with probability 1, the standard deviation of the posterior density of the tariff 
coefficient for SSA countries swamps the posterior mean.  These results of course mean 
that a sufficiently ambiguity averse agent would not lower tariffs.  A data miner could 
1 q =
  55produce a model, however, that supports a tariff reduction, as indicated by the most 
favorable models we report. 
We are surprised by the weakness of the evidence on heterogeneity given 
previous work
97 that found parameter heterogeneity, albeit in a very different statistical 
context.  However, the bottom line of this exercise is that sub-Saharan African 
heterogeneity does not appear to be important in the interpretation of our exercises with 
respect to policy evaluation except under a very high degree of ambiguity aversion. 
  As we have suggested in our earlier discussion of policy evaluation as a decision 
theory problem, using hypothesis tests to analyze growth policies suffers from the 
problem that statistical significance (or its analog) may not constitute an appropriate way 
to think about policymaker preferences.  We therefore provide some additional analyses 
that allow one to discuss a tariff change as a counterfactual from the perspective of the 
distribution of growth rates.  Table 4 reports an exercise for the sub-Saharan African 
economies in which the mean and variance of the growth rate for each country between 
1960 and 1985 is compared with and without a 10% reduction of tariffs as compared to 
what occurred historically.  To do this, we use the posterior means and variances of the 
model parameters  , ,  and  β γδ  based on the historical data. We then compute the 
posterior mean and variance of  i g  with and without a 10% reduction in the tariff variable, 
keeping all other regressor values constant.  We assume that the errors in the growth 
process are independent of the regressors. This type of exercise may be criticized using 
Lucas critique-type arguments, as we do not account for the effects of the policy change 
on model parameters (or for that matter on the other regressors which are themselves 
endogenous). Nevertheless, we think the exercise is useful in terms of illustrating how a 
decision-theoretic approach to evaluating the tariff policy differs from the conventional 
hypothesis testing approach.  We also compare these estimates with those models which 
possessed the largest and smallest tariff coefficients.  For the model averaging exercises, 
we employ a theory inclusion probability  .5 q = , which reflects our judgment that the 
theories we have allowed for are ex ante quite plausible, i.e. that the growth process is 
best understood as driven by a relatively large number of factors; we have separately 
verified that the results we report are quantitatively similar for other probability choices.  
We do not allow for parameter heterogeneity; as one would suspect from Table 3, 
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property is .5 or .75.  In addition to the model averaging exercises, Table 4 also reports 
results for the models with the largest and smallest tariff parameters. 
  What sorts of conclusions might one draw from the information in Table 4?  One 
finding of importance is the heterogeneity in the expected growth levels across countries.  
Focusing on the estimates under model averaging, Botswana, for example, is associated 
with an expected growth over this period of over 100% whereas Burundi had an expected 
growth of -9%.  The differences in the standard deviations are much smaller. The reason 
for this is that the uncertainty in the growth rates is very much dominated by the 
contribution of the model error. Even with these similarities in the standard deviations, 
the cross-country heterogeneity in the posterior densities of growth rates means that in 
general, one cannot make strong policy statements for mean/variance loss functions 
without explicitly calculating the moments of the growth process; the invariance of policy 
advice that one finds using a loss function such as (45) is not general.  It is easy to 
construct loss functions where one would advise one sub-Saharan African country to 
lower tariffs but not another, using the same econometric information from cross-country 
growth regressions.  
  A second finding is that the effects of a change in tariffs on the standard deviation 
of a country’s growth are far smaller than one would guess from looking at the standard 
deviation of the density for the tariff parameter in isolation.  In fact, in many of the cases, 
one finds a reduction in the posterior standard deviation of the expected growth rate.  The 
reason for this is that the different growth determinants may be interpreted as different 
elements of a portfolio; in the growth case they apparently act to reduce the overall 
variance of the growth rate, at least in terms of the data we have analyzed.  This once 
again suggests the importance of specifying priors and computing posterior densities of 
the outcomes of interest, and not focusing on model parameters in isolation.  From the 
perspective of a policymaker with mean/variance preferences, a tariff reduction may have 
desirable effects in terms of stabilizing the growth rate.  These findings are not affected 
by considering the two extreme models reported in the Table.   
  In evaluating the results in Table 4, it is essential to keep in mind that the 
counterfactual assumed that the values of all the growth determinants  i X  and  i Z  are 
  57known; so that all uncertainty about the growth process is generated via the parameters 
associated with the determinants. So, we certainly do not wish to argue that the estimates 
of variance in the expected component of growth are as precise as suggested in Table 4.  
Nevertheless, we believe this exercise helps demonstrate the utility of thinking about 
policies as elements of a “portfolio” that determines the variability of outcomes of 
interest.  This is, of course, exactly the idea that Brainard originated in his seminal 
analysis.
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  Overall, we believe this analysis provides support for a policy of tariff reduction 
for sub-Saharan Africa, unless one has very strong priors that a growth model applied to 
the rest of the world does not apply to that region. 
 
  
7. Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
 
In this paper, we have attempted to exposit a perspective on policy evaluation that 
explicitly places such evaluations in a decision-theoretic context and which explicitly 
accounts for uncertainty about the structure or model that describes the economic 
environment under analysis.  On the theoretical side, this approach indicates that many of 
the standard objects of econometric study, for example evaluations of the statistical 
significance of a policy variable, may not be appropriate guides to policy analysis.  The 
approach is also shown to allow for the evaluation of questions such as the robustness of 
policies in the presence of model uncertainty.  We have also made some suggestions 
about how to implement this approach empirically.  An example of empirical 
implementation to growth econometrics provided some additional insights relative to 
what is learned from more conventional approaches, although there are also important 
respects in which our new approach did not provide particularly different insights from 
what one finds from OLS exercises.  
We reiterate that the methods we have described and the new literature in which it 
is situated still have far to go in terms of new methodological work.  One important class 
of extensions may be defined in terms of generalizing our basic framework to better 
account for dynamics.  For example, we have not dealt with issues relating to the 
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model space as fixed; the only thing that evolves over time is the set of posterior model 
probabilities.  This approach fails to incorporate the possibility that the set which a 
policymaker perceives as possible descriptions of the economy evolves over time; as we 
have argued earlier, this evolution has implications for whether the true model lies in the 
model space or not.  Similarly, our analysis has not explicitly considered issues of policy 
choice when choices are updated across time in response to learning by the policymaker. 
Further, once learning is introduced, one can imagine an experimental design component 
to policy choice.  A second important class of extensions concerns statistical issues.  For 
example, our pseudo-Bayesian approach to integrating model uncertainty into a 
frequentist framework leads to a host of econometric questions in terms of how to do 
statistical inference for comparing the performance of different policy rules.  Yet another 
question concerns possible nonlinearities in dynamic models; a body of work initiated by 
James Hamilton
99 suggests that the macroeconomy exhibits shifts across regimes; 
allowing for this possibility could prove to produce first-order effects in comparing 
stabilization policies.  Regime shifts represent an additional layer of model uncertainty if 
a policymaker is not sure which regime is in effect when making a policy choice.  Work 
is needed both to illustrate how to calculate policy effects accounting for possible 
nonlinearities (one loses the simple variance calculations that may be done with linear 
time series) as well as on the specification of model spaces and prior probabilities.   
These limitations are not surprising, since the incorporation of model uncertainty 
into econometric analysis is still in its infancy.  We believe that explicit attention to 
model uncertainty and the use of decision-theoretic methods will prove to be a fruitful 
direction for future macroeconomic research.  At a minimum, explicitly accounting for 
model uncertainty in a decision-theoretic framework is an important step in clarifying the 
limits to which econometric analysis can contribute to policy evaluation.  
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Table 1 




y λ  
 
 






y g  
 
 




model averaging vs. 
Rudebusch-Svensson 
0.00 0.10 4.5 2.0  0.2  306 
0.00 0.50 2.3 1.0  0.4  17 
0.00 1.00 1.7 0.7  0.5  -2 
0.50 0.10 4.4 2.7  0.0  56 
0.50 0.50 2.4 1.3  0.3  1 
0.50 1.00 1.8 0.9  0.4  -9 
1.00 0.10 4.3 3.2 -0.1 16 
1.00 0.50 2.5 1.6  0.2  -7 
1.00 1.00 1.7 1.0  0.4  -10 
2.00 0.10 4.1 3.7 -0.2 8 
2.00 0.50 2.5 1.9  0.1  -13 
2.00 1.00 1.8 1.3  0.3  -14 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Columns ( y λ ) and ( i λ ) report the assumed weights in the risk function (37),  
( ) ( ) ( ) ty ti t Rv a r v a r y v a ri πλ λ =+ + ∆ . 
Columns (gπ ), ( ) and ( ) report the optimal values for the monetary policy rule eq. (38),   y g i g
1 tt y t i ig g yg i ππ t − =++,  
when the Rudebusch-Svensson (1999) model given by (40)-(41),  
11 22 1 1 1 () ty t y t r t t yy y i αααπ −−− − =+−− + t u
t +
 
11 22 33 44 1 1 tt t t t y t yv ππ π π π β πβ πβ πβ πβ −−−−− =++++  
is assumed to generate the data.  The last column reports the percentage increase in risk when the model 
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Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
The tariff variable measures tariffs on intermediate goods and inputs and corresponds to OWTI in the 
standard Barro and Lee data set. 
 
Column (OLS) reports the OLS estimates based on (44), 
ii i i gX Z p i β γδ ε ′ ′ = +++  
for Solow variables and tariff.   
Column (Full OLS) reports the OLS estimates based on (42) for the set of all available variables.   
Columns (BMA) report the Bayesian Model Averaging estimates over alternative specifications of (44) 
with priors generated with inclusion probabilities, q, of .25, .50 and .75.   
Column (Min Coefficient) reports the coefficient estimate and standard error for the version of (44) with 
the smallest coefficient estimate out of all the models used in the Bayesian Model Averaging exercises 
(variables included: Int, MNGD, MINV, MSCH, MGDP60, OWTI, RERD,GGCFD, CIVLIBb, 
DMCYBL).   
Column (Max Coefficient) reports the coefficient estimate and standard error for the version of (44) with 
the largest coefficient estimate out of all the models used in the Bayesian Model Averaging exercises 
(variables included: Int, MNGD, MINV, MSCH, MGDP60, OWTI, BMPL, LLY, EcOrg, RULELAW, 
CIVLIBb).  
Column (Min Mean +2σ ) reports the coefficient estimate and standard error for the version of (44) where 
the coefficient estimate plus twice the standard error is smallest for all the models used in the Bayesian 
Model Averaging exercises (variables included: Int, MNGD, MINV, MSCH, MGDP60, OWTI, RERD, 
GVXDXE5, DMCYBL, PI6089, PIHYP6089).   
Column (Max Mean +2σ ) reports the coefficient estimate and standard error for the version of (44) where 
the coefficient estimate plus twice the standard error is largest for all the models used in the Bayesian 
Model Averaging exercises (variables included: Int, MNGD, MINV, MSCH, MGDP60, OWTI, DCPY, 
LLY, EcOrg, RULELAW, CIVLIBb). 
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Tariff Coefficient Estimates Under Different Prior Heterogeneity Probabilities for 
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Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
Column (OLS) reports the OLS estimates based on (46), 
,,, , i i i i i i SSA i i SSA i i SSA i gX Z pX Z p β γδβ ξγ ξδ ξε ′′ ′ ′ =+ + + + + +  
for Solow variables and tariff.  Column (Full OLS) reports the OLS estimates based on (46) for the set of 
all available variables.  Column (BMA Prior Heterogeneity Probabilities) reports the Bayesian Model 
Averaging estimates using versions of (46) with priors generated with an inclusion probability of .50 and 
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Table 4: Expected Growth Change for SSA Countries Predicted by the Model as 
The Policy Variable (Tariff) is Decreased by 10%. 
Heterogeneity for SSA is not Considered.  
Inclusion Probability: .50 
Expected Growth from model with 
smallest coefficient on tariff 
Expected Growth from model with 
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Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
Table 4 reports an exercise for the sub-Saharan African economies in which the mean and variance of the 
growth rate for each country between 1960 and 1985 is compared with and without a 10% reduction of 
tariffs as compared to what occurred historically.  To do this, we use the posterior means and variances of 
the model parameters  , ,  and  β γδ  based on the historical data. We then compute the posterior mean and 
variance of   with and without a 10% reduction in the tariff variable, keeping all other regressor values 
constant.  We assume that the errors in the growth process are independent of the regressors. Standard 




  65Computational Appendix 
 
 
Posterior Coefficient Densities 
 
Posterior densities for the parameters of growth models were calculated under the 
following assumptions.  For a given regression, let   denote the regressor associated 




   1 ii i gS i I ζ ε = += K  (47) 
 
In order to compute the posterior distribution of ζ  given data and a specific model, i.e. 
( , dm µζ ) , we assume first that there is no informative prior information available on 
the coefficients.  In more standard language, we impose a noninformative prior on the 
coefficients, i.e.  
 
  ( ) c µζ ∝  (48) 
 
Second, we assume that the errors are i.i.d. normal with a known variance.  Under this 
assumption, one can show
100 that the posterior density of the regression coefficients is  
 
  () () ( )
1 2 ˆ ,, dm N S S ε µ ζζ
− ′   σ  (49) 
 
where  ˆ ζ  is the OLS estimate of the coefficient parameters in (47).  Notice also that 
()
1 2 SS ε σ
− ′  is the OLS variance estimate for the parameters when the error variance is 
known. A helpful feature of this formula is that it means that the parameters of the 
posterior density of ζ  have OLS interpretations. The assumption that the error variance 
is known is not serious when the number of observations is large relative to the number 
of regressors. 
  66  We should note that there is a considerable discussion in the literature about the 
appropriate choice of priors even for this model.  Fernandez, Ley and Steel
101 consider a 
range of alternative priors and argue in favor of a different set of priors than those we 
employ.  We do not claim that our choice of priors is in any sense optimal; we employ it 
here in order to produce a close relationship between OLS estimates and Bayesian 
posterior estimates. 
 
Model Averaging Calculations 
 
 
1. Monetary policy 
 
  All Bayesian model averaging exercises in the monetary policy section of the 




All Bayesian model averaging exercises in the growth section of the paper were 
calculated using SPLUS. The number of models under study was small enough to allow 
the analysis to calculate posterior coefficient densities using all available models.  For 
larger exercises, it is necessary to use a search algorithm to focus on models with 
relatively large posterior probabilities.  One such program is bicreg written by Adrian 
Raftery and available at www.research.att.com/~volinsky/bma.html. This procedure uses 
an “Occam’s Window” procedure due to David Madigan and Raftery.
102 In adapting the 
code for our exercise, a few adjustments were necessary that are available from the 
authors. 
Prior probabilities were set as follows. For a given growth specification, one first 
specifies the probability a given theory is included. Table 2 allows these probabilities to 
be .25, .5, and .75.  For a given theory, with  empirical proxies, there are   different 
ways to include these proxies. Each specification is assumed to have equal ex ante 
probability.  Table 3 reports results where each specification of a set of theories and 
empirical proxies used to calculate Table 2 is matched with a corresponding model with 
r 2 1
r −
  67sub-Saharan Africa heterogeneity, with corresponding specifications given equal 
probability. 
The calculation of posterior model probabilities can also be computationally 
difficult.  In order to handle these calculations, we follow an approximation suggested by 
Raftery
103 which exploits the fact if the data under study fulfill the necessary conditions 
for posterior coefficient distributions to converge to their associated maximum likelihood 
estimators, one can use the maximum likelihood estimates as approximations to the 
posterior distributions and therefore avoid the need to specify a particular prior on the 
coefficients within a model; in essence the weights are BIC adjusted likelihoods. This 
greatly simplifies the calculations of posterior model probabilities.
104  O f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  
approximation becomes more accurate the larger the data set.  The program for this 
approximation is taken from bicreg described above.  
  68Data Appendix 
 
1. Monetary policy 
 
  In the monetary policy section, all data were obtained from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of  St. Louis website.  Real GDP is measured in chained 1996 dollars, with inflation 
measured by the corresponding price index.  Potential GDP is the Congressional Budget 
Office measure.  The quarterly average Federal Funds rate was computed by averaging 








MNGD:  where n=population growth,  =exogenous rate of technical 
change, and  =depreciation.  
( ln ngd ++) g
d gd +  is assumed to equal .05 for all countries. Source: 
Mankiw, Romer, Weil (1992) 
 
MINV: log of the investment rate. Source, Mankiw, Romer, Weil (1992) 
 
ln(SCHOOL); log of the fraction of the population between ages 12 and 17 enrolled in 
school multiplied by fraction of working age population between ages of 15 and 19. 
Source: Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). 
 
MGDP60, log of per capita income in 1960, Source: Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). 
 







OWTI: Own Import Weighted Tariff Rates on Intermediate Inputs and Capital Goods; 
Source: Barro and Lee (1994). 
 
 
2. Exchange rates 
 
  69BMPL6089: Black Market Premium. 30-year averages: 1960 - 1989. log(1+BMP). 
Source: Barro and Lee (1994). 
 





PI6089: Average Inflation Rate for the period 1960-89; Sala-i-Martin (1997). Original 
Source: Levine and Renelt (1992). 
 




4. Government spending 
  
GGCFD: Ratio of Real Public Domestic Investment to Real GDP; Barro and Lee (1994). 
 
GVXDXE5: Ratio of Real Government “Consumption” Expenditure Net of Spending on 





1. Economic structure 
 
EcOrg: Capitalism. Index of degree of capitalism as measured by Freedom House (1994).   
Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).   
 
RULELAW: Index of rule of law; Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997). 
 
 
2. Financial structure 
 
DCPY: Ratio of Gross Claims on the Non-Financial Private Sector by Central Bank and 
Deposit Banks to GDP; Source: King and Levine (1993) 
 




3. Political structure 
 
Civilly: Index of civil liberties.  Source: Knack and Keefer (1995). 
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